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OF CONTROLLING

PERSONS

INTRODUcTION

In the course of adopting the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (die Exchange Act)
(together the Securities Acts) Congress determined that, to be effective, a scheme of federal securities regulation should encompass the
conduct of persons with control of direct perpetrators of securities
fraud. 3 Consequently, Congress included provisions in the Securities
Act (section 15) 4 and the Exchange Act (section 20(a)) 5 that provide
for the potential liability of persons -based on their control relationship with primary violators of those Acts. Under these provisions, controlling persons are liable to the same extent as their controlled
persons, unless the controlling persons can establish the defenses provided for under the measures. 6 Despite the controlling persons provi1 Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 ,U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa

(1994)).
2 Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1994)).
3 See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
4 Section 15 of the Securities Act provides that:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding
with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under [section 11 or section 12], shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994). Note that in this Article I refer to sections of the Securities
Acts by their original, widely recognized section numbers. However, I will cite them
to their current U.S.C. section.
5 Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
6 See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities
Law: ControllingPersonLiability, Respondeat Superior,andAiding andAbetting, 40 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1007 (1983); William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Underthe FederalSecurities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, ControllingPerson, and Agency: Common-Law
Principlesand the Statutory Scheme, 14J. CORP. L. 313 (1988); Note, "Controlling"Securities Fraud:Proposed Liability Standardsfor ControllingPersons Under the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, 72 MINN. L. REv. 930 (1988).
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sions' potential as enforcement tools and sources of compensation for
victims of Securities Acts violations, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the scope and proper application of the measures more than
sixty years after their enactment. I will address that uncertainty
herein.
Congress employed broad language in sections 15 and 20(a) to
allow federal courts the flexibility to interpret the provisions in light
of evolving practices in securities transactions.7 The courts' task has
been made more daunting by the provisions' sparse legislative history.8 Given the sweep of the provisions' language and the minimal
legislative history concerning them, it perhaps is not surprising that
uniform approaches to the resolution of certain central questions
about controlling person liability under the Securities Acts have not
emerged. Though broad, the language employed in sections 15 and
20(a) does support the consensus that liability under both provisions
turns on the presence of (i) the primary Securities Acts liability of the
putative controlled person, (ii) control by the defendant over the primary Securities Acts violator, and (iii) the failure of the defendant
controlling person to establish the statutory defenses contained in the
provisions. 9 Significantly, however, the federal courts have not been
in agreement about the following issues: 1) how to determine when a
person is a controlling person within the meaning of sections 15 and
20(a); 10 or 2) how a controlling person, to avoid liability, can satisfy
the requirements of the defenses provided for in the sections." Be7 See, e.g., infra note 54 and accompanying text.

8 For example, the only direct legislative history concerning the controlling persons provisions (that appearing in a legislative report) is found in a single paragraph.
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.

9 See generally Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 6, at 1007-22.
10 For example, some courts have held that a person may be presumed to be a
controlling person based on the person's position or status, say as a corporate officer
or director, if it necessarily conveys upon its holder the potential for control. See, e.g.,
Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1974)
(holding that "status" may suffice to render one a controlling person if the status is
such that it involves potential for control). Other courts have rejected an approach
that allows a controlling person determination to be made based on the occupation
of a position or status that is potentially a controlling one. See, e.g., Dennis v. General
Imaging, Inc., 918 F.2d 496, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1990) (standing for the proposition that
no presumptions should be made with regard to the controlling person status of persons because they were corporate directors of a primary Securities Acts violator).
11 For example, some courts have required "culpable participation" (active involvement in the controlled person's Securities Acts violation) for controlling person
liability. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers &Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that section 20(a) requires "culpable participation" in the securities violation);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (concluding that
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cause of the failure of the federal courts to develop uniform, coherent
approaches to these two questions, sometimes confusing and frequently questionable results have emerged in cases decided under sections 15 and 20(a).1 2 Moreover, the courts' treatment of the
controlling person determination and defense to liability issues can be
characterized as cursory, since most opinions dealing with them offer
little meaningful exploration of policy considerations. A cohesive,
purposeful body of law has yet to develop under the controlling persons provisions.
This Article examines controlling person determination and liability, and offers approaches to help resolve some of the major uncertainties that have plagued judicial construction of sections 15 and
20(a). The focus will be on plausible interpretations in light of statutory language, legislative history and context, case law, and policy considerations. Part II examines the background of the controlling
persons provisions. Part III focuses on the nature of the relationship
between a primary violator of the Securities Acts and another person
that should render the latter a "controlling person." Part IV considers
the defenses to liability under sections 15 and 20(a). In PartV, several
hypothetical situations involving potential liability under the controlling persons provisions are explored. Part VI considers the implications of sections 15 and 20(a) for various persons. Finally, in Part VII,
a brief conclusion is set forth.
II.

BACKGROUND

Investigation of the stock market crash of 1929 exposed the fact
that during the 1920s and continuing into the 1930s, fraudulent and
manipulative activities accompanied much of the distribution of and
trading in securities.' 3 Because the true condition of and prospects
directors could not be liable under section 20(a) unless they were culpable participants in the fraud perpetrated by controlled persons).
Other circuit courts have not required "culpable participation." See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992); First Interstate
Bank of Denver, NA. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA.,
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that the language of the statute premises liability on the
control relationship, so that culpable participation is not required); Hunt v. Miller,
908 F.2d 1210, 1215 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the failure of a brokerage firm to
maintain an adequate system of internal control may be a basis for liability under
section 20(a)).
12 SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that the
judicial interpretation of section 20(a) has "hardly been a history of consistency").
13 See H.R. RE.,. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) ("High-pressure salesmanship rather than
careful counsel was the rule in this most dangerous of enterprises.").
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for many investment vehicles were obscured or misrepresented, 14
large quantities of unsound securities were distributed to the frequently uninformed and misinformed investing public.' 5 Determined
to eradicate unseemly and unsound securities activities and practices,
the Roosevelt administration' 6 and Congress sought comprehensive
federal legislation to bring an end to such practices and to restore
public confidence in the securities markets. 17 Their efforts
culminated with passage of the Securities Acts. In this legislation,
Congress imposed primary civil' 8 and criminal liability' 9 on the direct
perpetrators of fraudulent and manipulative conduct in securities
transactions.
Congress also included sections 15 and 20(a) in the Securities
Acts to provide for the potential liability of persons controlling the direct
perpetratorsof fraudulent and manipulative conduct in securities transactions. The specter of persons reaping benefits from such conduct
while being insulated from liability was perceived to be part of the
20 It
reason for the erosion of confidence in the securities markets.
was necessary for Congress to include specific controlling persons liability provisions in the Securities Acts because many persons with control over direct perpetrators of securities fraud might otherwise have
14 See id. ("Alluring promises of easy wealth were freely made with little or no
attempt to bring to the investor's attention those facts essential to estimating the
worth of any security.").
15 One half of the nearly 50 billion dollars worth of securities sold in the United
States between 1920 and 1933 were worthless by 1933. 1 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN,
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 169 (3d ed. 1995).
16 It was a Roosevelt administration draft bill that formed the basic framework for
what eventually became the Securities Act. SeeJOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET 52 (1982).

17 See

MICHAEL PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE

NEW

DEAL

3 (1970)

("For many New Dealers like Frankfurter, and for Roosevelt himself, financial regulation was central to the New Deal. Making capitalism live up to its pretensions necessitated a restoration of public confidence in the governing symbols and basic currency
of the economic order-investment securities."); James M. Landis, The Legislative Histoty of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1959) ("Investment
bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate directors, accountants, all found themselves
the object of criticism so severe that the American public lost much of its faith in
professions that had theretofore been regarded with a respect that had approached
awe.").
18 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994). A seller of securities in violation of section
5 of the Securities Act may be liable to purchasers pursuant to section 12(1) of the
Securities Act.
19 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994). Under section 32(a) of the Exchange Act,
anyone who solicits proxies by means of false or misleading proxy materials may be
criminally liable.

20

See Landis, supra note 17, at 30.
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continued to be immune from liability, in light of applicable legal
principles.2 1 The direct participation required to sustain a cause of
action for a primary violation based on malfeasance or misfeasance
22
could have been avoided or disguised by many persons with control.
Further, primary Securities Acts liability based on nonfeasance would
have been available only in certain circumstances, which may not have
23
included many control relationships.
Where, as frequently would be the case, the primary Securities
Acts violators were corporations, establishing a causal link between securities violations and controlling persons would have been especially
difficult in light of traditional legal principles. Without sections 15
and 20 (a), the separate-legal-person status of corporations would have
provided an impenetrable shield from liability for some persons who
controlled Securities Acts violators. Persons controlling corporations
from "inside" and "outside" might have claimed immunity from liability on the ground that any violations of securities laws were committed
by the corporation.2 4 Further, traditional common-law based secondary liability could have been avoided by many controlling persons,
inasmuch as it relied on agency principles. In this regard, the conduct of a corporation's agents violative of securities laws could not
have been attributed to those who were part of the formal organiza21 William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The FederalSecuritiesAct of 1933, 43 YALE
LJ. 171, 174 (1933) (explaining that, prior to the enactment of the Securities Act,
"[s]atisfaction of the common-law requirements of fraud raised almost insurmountable barriers to recovery").
22 Primary liability under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, generally
speaking, will be at least loosely based on common-law principles, unless express statutory language provides otherwise. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). Most bases of common-law fraud liability required and continue to require
either malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. Malfeasance and misfeasance require an affirmative act on the part of the wrongdoer. It would have been difficult to
show the requisite kind of manifest affirmative acts by controlling persons in many
cases involving securities fraud, since other persons would have been "acting." See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 106-07 (5th ed.
1984). While the discussion here focuses on the circumstances extant at the time of
the passage of the Securites Acts, the common-law fraud requirements have remained
essentially unchanged.
23 Under traditional legal principles nonfeasance cannot be a basis for liability
for fraud unless defendant owes a "special duty" to plaintiff. See id. at 376. Many
control relationships, however, would not be within the special duty exceptions recognized at common law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 314A (1965); see also
KEETON, supra note 22, at 376.
24 In an agency relationship the principal is the one for whom the action is to be
taken. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 1(2) (1958). The firm is the principal on
whose behalf enterprise activities are undertaken.
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tional hierarchyw-shareholders, directors, and dominant officers-on
the basis of agency, because the principal in the agency relationship
would have been the corporation.2 5 Evidence of an agency relationship between primary Securities Acts violators and persons external to
an enterprise (persons not part of the formal organizational hierarchy) rarely would have been readily available to potential plaintiffs.
To a quite limited extent, the Securities Act addressed some of
the potential defenses to primary and secondary liability directly by
specifically placing some responsibility and potential liability on directors. 2 6 Such an approach was consistent with the mandate of corporation law statutes. Under these statutes the business and affairs of
27
corporate enterprises were to be managed by the board of directors.
In reality, however, by the 1930s corporate control was manifesting
itself in some ways not contemplated by corporate statutes and in
28
some ways theretofore unknown.
By the 1930s, effective control of many enterprises did not rest
with the board of directors, but rather was in the hands of profes25
26

Id.
See section 11 the Securities Act, stating:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted
to state a material act required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security. . . may, either at law or in equity... sue
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of
the registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted

15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
Greater express responsibility and liability for directors would add little to the
effectiveness of the statutory framework if those with control could rely on the legal
powers of directors to act "independently" to insulate them from liability. Where
boards were populated by "dummies" lacking deep pockets, evasion of meaningful
responsibility and liability could be completed with relative ease.
27 Corporation statutes in this era typically provided that the business and affairs
of the corporation were to be managed by the board of directors. See EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 30-32 (1981). Eventually, corporation
statutes were amended to provide that corporations are to be managed "by or under the
authority of... its board of directors." REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.01(b) (1984)
(emphasis added); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors .... ). This change was made to reflect
the realistic limitations on the ability of directors to actually "manage" the large decentralized firm.
28 See HE.MuAN, supra note 27, at ch. 3.

1997]

LIABILITY

OF CONTROLLING

PERSONS

sional officers/managers who controlled the proxy machinery, 2 9 or
with "outside" forces with financial and other leverage that enabled
them to dictate corporate policies.3 0 In management dominated companies, the boards often were populated by compliant directors. 3 1 Enterprises controlled externally frequently had boards dominated by
those outside forces that saw to it that the board marched to their
tune.3 2 Thus, by the 1930s the boards of many companies were populated by "dummy" directors with fealty to inside or outside forces controlling them, but with no real commitment to independent
stewardship of their enterprises.3 3 Hence, with, respect to an enterprise or related group of enterprises, those persons controlling corporate decision-making processes and personnel frequently were not the
directors but other persons in a variety of relationships-internal and
external-with the organization. Many of these controlling persons
effectively would have been shielded from primary liability for securities fraud because of the difficulty of establishing causation under
traditional legal principles.3 4 Further, they would not have been exposed to any secondary liability, since no basis existed for such liability
under extant legal principles.3 5
In light of this background, it seems reasonable to surmise that
Congress included sections 15 and 20(a) in the Securities Acts to address the obstacles to controlling person liability for securities fraud
posed by extant liability principles and evolving patterns of corporate
governance. Congress determined that to be effective against the
fraudulent and deceptive securities practices rampant in the 1920s
and early 1930s, a comprehensive scheme of securities regulation required inclusion of measures specifically designed to place some responsibility and potential liability on persons controlling primary
violators of the regulatory scheme.
The initial efforts to bring controlling persons within the purview
of federal securities regulation appeared in the original Senate ver29

As corporations grew in size and ownership was distributed among increasingly

large numbers of shareholders, policy decisions and daily operations were removed to
managers. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 9-10 (1977).
30 See HERMAN, supra note 27, at 13, 22 (discussing financial institutions as control
vehicles); BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE CRASH & ITS AfrERMATH 41 (1985) (describing the
role of holding companies in corporate control).
31 See generally William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv.
1305 (1934).
32 H.R. REP. No. 73-152, at 12 (1933); see, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 30.
33 Douglas, supra note 31.
34 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
35 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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sion of what was to become the Securities Act. 3 6 That proposal con-

tained

provisions

that

were

intended

to

"do

away

with

the. . . dangerous and unreliable system of depending upon dummy
directors who have no responsibility."3 7 It reflected congressional
concern about the use of "other persons" to avoid responsibility and
liability for malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in connection
with securities transactions. Section 13 of the original Senate bill
would have made so-called dummy38 directors as well as their controlling persons liable for fraud perpetrated by corporations through the
use of dummies.3 9
When the House and Senate bills were reconciled and a compromise was agreed upon, the idea behind the Senate provision on
dummy directors emerged in a new measure that provided for controlling person liability. 40 The conference committee deleted references to dummies from the final bill.4 ' Instead, section 15 of the
Securities Act imposed liability on any person who controlled a person
42
liable under sections 11 or 12 of the Act.
36 S. 875, 73d Cong. (1933).
37 S. REP.No. 73-47, at 5-6 (1933); see Stock Exchange Practices:Hearingson S. Res. 84
(72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, (pt. 15), 73d Cong. 6556 (1934) (remark of Senator Alben W. Barkley).
38 "Dummy" was defined in the bill as amended to mean:
[A] person who holds legal or nominal tide to any property but is under
moral or legal obligation to recognize another as the owner thereof; or a
person who has nominal power or authority to act in any capacity but is
under moral or legal obligation to act therein in accordance with the direction of another.
S.875, 73d Cong. § 2(k) (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. REc. 2979 (1933).
39 The draft proposal provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or other entity... to employ any "dummy", or to act as any such "dummy", with the
intent to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise, or to engage in any transaction.., relating to the ... purchase or sale of any securities which operates
or would operate as a fraud upon the purchaser. The director or other person for whom any "dummy" shall act shall be held responsible under this act
for any unlawful conduct by such "dummy."
S. 875, 73d Cong. § 13 (1933), reprinted in 77 CONG. Rrc. 2982 (1933).
40 H.R. REP. No. 73-152, at 12 (1933). The original House of Representatives'
version did not contain a "dummy" provision. The House version did provide for the
imposition of liability on directors for false or deceptive representations.
41 Id.
42 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 15, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (1933) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1994)). As originally enacted, section 15 read: "Every person who, by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise... controls any person liable under
section 11 or 12, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
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Section 15, as originally enacted, was criticized as being overly
broad because, in effect, it imposed an "insurer's" liability on controlling persons, since it provided for no defense to liability. 43 Responding to this criticism, Congress, in 1934, amended section 15 to provide
a statutory defense to controlling person liability. 44 At the same time
that Congress amended section 15 of the Securities Act, it incorporated a differently worded controlling person provision, section 20 (a),
into the Exchange Act.45
While sections 15 and 20(a) are worded differently, it is clear that
their fundamental purposes are the same. 4 6 Both provisions are
designed'to provide for responsibility and liability for persons controlling primary Securities Acts violators, regardless of their identity. By expressly making all such persons potentially liable, Congress precluded
much of the use of traditional legal principles to shield controlling
persons from liability for Securities Acts violations. 4 7 Under sections
15 and 20(a), intra- as well as extra-organizational barriers can be penetrated to hold controlling persons liable, regardless of their identity,
for the Securities Acts violations of their controlled persons.
III.

DETERMINATION OF CONTROLLING PERSON STATUS

A.

Overview

Defendants in sections 15 and 20(a) actions may avoid liability on
the ground that they were not controlling persons. 48 Alternatively,
even if they are determined to be controlling persons, they will avoid
liability if they can establish the statutory defenses. 49 Thus, initially in
a section 15 or section 20(a) action, a determination must be made
with respect to whether each defendant is a "controlling person." Section 15 describes a controlling person as "every person who controls
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable."
Id.

43 See id.
44 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 208, 48 Stat. 881, 908 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994)). The amendment added to the section the
following language: "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of
the controlled person is alleged to exist." Id.
45 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 20(a), 48 Stat. 881, 899 (1934)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994)).
46 Stock Exchange Practices:Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and 97
(73d Cong.) Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., at 6571 (1934).
47 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
48 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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by or through stock ownership, agency or otherwise."5 0 A controlling
person under section 20(a) is described as "every person who controls
directly or indirectly," 5' while its legislative history lists "stock ownership, lease, contract and agency

' 52

as examples of bases upon which a

person can be determined to be a controlling person. 53 Thus, Congress has identified some of the means by which a person may have
control within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). Congress has
not, however, offered a definitive formula for determining whether in
a particular context a person is a controlling person.
The legislative history of the controlling persons provisions does
indicate that Congress deliberately declined to fix exclusive criteria
for controlling person determinations under sections 15 and 20 (a). It
was thought that the concept of controlling person under the sections
should remain flexible enough to meet a wide variety of situations,
including those that could not be foreseen at the time of the measures' enactments. 54 Congress left to the federal courts the task of
making controlling person determinations in particular cases. Given
the lack of clear congressional direction, perhaps it is not surprising
that there is conflict, controversy, and a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the question of how to determine whether a person is a controlling person within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). 5 One
important question that has divided courts concerns what role a person's status or position should play in a controlling person determination. Is the mere possession of the right to control a sufficient basis
for concluding that a person is a controlling person, or must there
have been some significant, manifest exercise of control over the primary Securities Acts violator?5 6 Other important questions include
50

15 U.S.C. § 77(o) (1994).

51
52

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 26 (1934).

53 The two provisions do use different language to describe controlling persons.
This difference does not seem to be significant, since the two descriptions are not at
odds, and courts and commentators have not suggested that a controlling person
determination would be affected by which of the two provisions is at issue.
54 For example, "control" is not defined in sections 15 and 20(a). This declination was intentional. Congress announced that "[i]t was thought undesirable to at-

tempt to define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to
anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted." H.R. REP. No. 731383, at 26 (1934).

55 Shortly after the passage of the Securities Act, commentators noted that the
controlling persons provisions would clearly reach majority shareholders, but that the
further reach of "control" was uncertain. See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, supra note 21, at
191.
56 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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whether there can be more than one controlling person with respect
to the same primary violator and whether or under what circumstances a group can be a controlling person. Moreover, the highly
generalized consideration of controlling person determinations
found in the case law and commentary offers little clue as to how the
answers to a myriad of critical questions might or should change depending on whether the context involves publicly held or privately
held enterprises. For example, are outside directors and executive officers of large corporations controlling persons within the purview of
sections 15 and 20(a), notwithstanding the fact that decentralized
management results in significant securities activities taking place
without their direct participation? That there is some disagreement
or uncertainty about the answers to such basic questions is indicative
of a fundamental absence of consensus about the nature of the control addressed by sections 15 and 20(a).
B.

General Considerations

Control is a rather elusive concept that has been variously defined. The Securities and Exchange Commission has defined it as
follows:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled by" and "under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction
of the management and policies of a person, whether through
the
57
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.
This definition is an appropriate starting point for our analysis, since
it focuses on power without attempting to limit its coverage to any specifically identified persons. Congress wished to address abuses by
those with power over primary violators of the Securities Acts, regardless of the controlling person's identity, with its passage of sections 15
and 20(a). 5 8
Power refers to the capacity of its possessor to enforce its will over
59 If A has the
the object of its power, should it choose to exercise it.
capacity to enforce its will in a way that can cause B to act in a way B
otherwise would not have, A has power over B.60 Power is at the core
57 17 C.FR. § 230.405 (1995) (emphasis added).
58 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59 PAUL HERSEY & KENNETH H. BLANCHARD, MANAGEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR UTILIZING HUMAN RESOURCES 43 (6th ed. 1993).
60 ALAN C. FILLEY,ET AL., MANAGERIAL PROCESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 92
(2d ed. 1976).
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of control.6 1 Power may be based on authority,6 2 by which I mean the
legal right to control. 63 The bases or sources of authority are found in
statutes, regulations, rules, and customs. 64 Where control is legitimized by statute, regulation, rule, or custom in the sense that the control would be sustained on such basis if subject to challenge, authority
exists. The capacity of A to cause B to act in a way B would not otherwise act may also be based on factors other than authority. 65 De facto
(actual) control may be possessed by other persons with significant
bases of power, other than authority, that provide them with the ca66
pacity to compel B to act in a prescribed way.
These observations about the nature of control have particular
relevance for an analysis of the controlling persons provisions. This
seems clear from the single paragraph that constitutes the only direct
legislative history (that found in a legislative report) regarding the
meaning of control under the controlling persons provisions: "In this
section [20(a)] . . . when reference is made to 'control', the term is
intended to include actual control as well as what has been called legally enforceable control."67 In Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, the
Supreme Court discussed "a kind of control called... 'actual' to distinguish it from a legally enforceable control."6 8 It can be noted that
"a legally enforceable control" has a dejure, as opposed to a de facto,
basis and thus is encompassed by authority. 69 This de jure/de facto
distinction is particularly useful for controlling person determinations. Authority to control and actual control should be considered as
alternative tests, either one of which may provide a basis for determining that a particular person is a controlling person within the purview
of sections 15 and 20(a).
61
62

AMrrAI ETZiONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS 59-60 (1964).
Fiu,
supra note 60, at 93.

63

Id.

64 Id. at 93-94. Organizations operate in their own internal legal framework in
addition to the applicable external legal framework that applies to all persons as well
as external law (corporate statutes) specifically addressed to organizations. Organizational bylaws are perhaps the most important manifestation of express organizational
rules. Of course, there are customary rules that apply to most organizations as well as
informal rules particular to an organization.
65 See infra notes 121-40 and accompanying text.
66 See ETzIONI, supra note 61, at ch. 6.
67 H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 26 (1934) (citing Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284
U.S. 136 (1931)).

68

Handy, 284 U.S. at 140.

ELLo-r JAQUES & STEPHEN D. CLEMENT, EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO MANAGING COMPLEXITY 10-11 (1991); see also GARETH MORGAN, IMAGES OF
ORGANIZATION 158-60 (1986).
69
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There may be more than one controlling person of a primary
Securities Acts violator since there may be several loci of control,
within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a), in a particular organizational framework. The retention of authority to control by one person
does not preclude actual control by other persons having power that
can be determinative with regard to the course of conduct of a particular controlled person. Persons with authority to control may delegate it wholly or partially and those with delegated authority may
control pursuant to their delegation, subject to being restrained or
countermanded by their delegator.7 0 For example, though corporate
officers may obtain considerable authority through board of director
delegations, the board ordinarily retains the inherent authority to
countermand them. 71 Such delegation and reservation of authority to
72
control is consistent with general corporate organizational norms,
under which executive officers manage corporate affairs while their
performance in that regard is monitored by the board of directors. 73
Further, although persons may have the authority to control a person-authority that would be sustained at law if challenged-other
persons also may have the power to assume or exert some de facto
control (actual control) over that same person.74 Hence, though the
board of directors has the authority to control a corporation, some of
70
71

See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
SeeJAQUES & CLEMENT, supranote 69; PINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 cmt. f (A.L.I. 1994) [hereinafter ALI, CoRpoRATE GOVERNANCE] (recognizing that "ultimate responsibility for approving major corporate plans and actions is vested in the board").
72 See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, § 3.02 cmt. a ("[T]he board
can normally satisfy the requirements of present statutes without either actively managing or directing the management of the corporation, as long as it oversees management and retains the decisive voice on major corporate actions."); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 311
(1983). Formal resolutions, informal communications, and acquiescence are all vehicles for delegations of authority from the board of directors to executive officers.
73 While the focus herein is on the corporate organizational framework, many
observations will apply by analogy in other organizational frameworks. Hence, the
management committee and the managing partner would be substituted for the
board of directors and president where the organizational context is one of partnership rather than corporation.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding
that, although Wolfson was not an officer or director, he was a controlling person
because he was the corporation's largest individual shareholder (though still a minority shareholder), the officers of the corporation were under his control, and no policy
decisions were made without his approval); SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp.
395, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (finding a person to be controlling, despite the fact that
hewas neither an officer nor a director, because he exercised de facto control over
the corporation through a relative).
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this power may be relinquished, for example, by allowing a creditor to
control some of the organization's monitoring or managing
functions. 75
In larger organizations, authority to control may be split along
divisional lines so that different persons have the right to control different divisions. Similarly, authority to control may be split along
functional lines so that one function, such as management of day-today operations, might be under the authority of one person while another function-for example, long range business planning and policy matters-might be under the authority of another person or
persons. 76 Such segmentations of authority to control in a particular
organizational framework would not preclude other persons having
actual control with respect to a particular segment.
It also seems clear that groups may have control within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). 7 7 The board of directors and committees thereof are groups that appropriately may be designated
controlling persons of corporate organizations based on their authority to control. 78 The more complex the organizational framework, the
more likely it is that the managerial functions executive officers are
authorized to perform, of necessity, will be shared. 79 Group control,
however, need not be based on shared authority. There may be actual
control by a group within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). The
characteristics of such a group cannot be described with certainty in
the abstract, but it should possess the requisite power and should reflect cohesion and action in concert for a common purpose before it
75 See infra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
76 Cf Fama &Jensen, supra note 72, at 308 (maintaining that in complex organizations, efficient decision control involves delegation and diffusion of decision control among agents with specific knowledge as well as separation of decision
management and control at different levels of an organization).
77 A-A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "In Control'?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW 559, 576-83 (1966);
see also Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 5 PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 43.
78 See REV. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 8.01(b) (1984) ("All corporate powers shall
be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation
set forth in the articles of incorporation."); id. § 8.25(a) ("Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, a board of directors may create one or more
committees and appoint members of the board of directors to serve on them. Each
committee must have two or more members, who serve at the pleasure of the board of
directors."); id. § 8.25(d) ("To the extent specified by the board of directors or in the
articles of incorporation or bylaws, each committee may exercise the authority of the
board of directors under section 8.01.").
79 See DAVID M. KoTz, BANK CONTROL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 16-17 (1978); Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 308-09.
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appropriately may be categorized as a controlling person.8 0 It is appropriate to classify each member of a controlling group as a controlling person-whether group control is based on authority, actual
control, or some combination thereof-unless a member takes steps
to disassociate from the group.
To the extent possible, a controlling person determination
should distinguish between control and mere influence. 8 ' Various
kinds of skills, traits, and relationships may provide a person with
some measure of influence,8 2 but influence is not power to exact compliance.8 3 While persons with influence can help persuade, persuasion is not command. Persons with control may have been appealed
to, advised, or counseled by a person with mere influence, but their
decisionmaking will not have been overborne by a person with mere
influence. A decision made or action taken may, in whole or in part,
be due to the influence of a particular person; however, unless it has
been compelled by some enforceable power of that person, they
should not be considered to be controlling persons within the meaning of sections 15 and 20(a). The influencer or persuader will not
have forced the decision or action violative of the Securities Acts and
hence should not face potential liability for it under the controlling
84
persons provisions.
Moreover, to include persons with mere influence within the controlling person definition would dilute the concept and increase litigation without corresponding benefits in terms of achieving the goals of
sections 15 and 20(a). All evidence points to congressional concern
80 See Sommer, supra note 77.
81 I use the term "mere influence" to describe influence not backed by enforceable power. It can be distinguished not only from control but also from "controlling
influence," a term sometimes used (though not herein) to describe a form of power
to control. See Edwin P. Hollander, Legitimacy, Power, and Influence: A Perspective on

Relational Featuresof Leadership, in

LEADERSHIP THEORY AND RESEARCH

29, 31 (Martin

M. Chemers & Roya Ayman eds., 1993); cf.FnLuv, supranote 60, at 93 (defining influence as "the capacity of A to get B to do something B would otherwise not have done
without resorting to the manipulation of rewards and punishments").
82 FniL', supra note 60, at 94.
83 Hollander, supra note 81, at 31.
84 As Edwin Hollander observes:
Power and influence are not the same, although they are at times used as
virtual synonyms. Classically, power is considered to be the ability to exert
some degree of control over other persons, things and events. In institutional terms, it is associated with authority relationships, and actual or implied coercion. By contrast, influence involves more persuasion, with the
recipient having latitude for a free choice, rather than be subject to imposed

authority.
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about power-based control as opposed to mere influence.8 5 There is
no evidence in the records of the efforts of the Roosevelt administration or Congress to suggest that sections 15 and 20(a) were somehow
aimed at persons with mere influence. Congress seemingly was more
concerned with the substantial threat posed by persons with authority
to controlwho default on their responsibility for Securities Acts compliance and by other persons with significant power bases who manifest
their actual controlwithout due regard for Securities Acts compliance.
Hence, the concerns of Congress reflected in its enactment of sections
15 and 20(a) can be met without expanding the controlling person
concept to encompass mere influence.
Further, controlling person status should not extend to so-called
transitive relationships. 86 For example, assume that an investment
banker is on the board of directors of an industrial company. While
the individual director may be presumed to be a controlling person
87
under sections 15 and 20(a) as a member of the controlling group,
his firm should not be deemed a controlling person solely on the basis
of the individual member's directorship. In this context, the power is
in the directors as a group, not in the group's individual members. In
the absence of evidence that the investment firm somehow controlled
the majority of the board members or evidence that it had other bases
of power, the firm should not be within the purview of sections 15 and
20(a). 8 8

C.

ControllingPerson Status Based on Authority to Control

In corporate organizational frameworks, several persons can be
identified as ordinarily having authority to control that should render
them controlling persons within the meaning of sections 15 and
20 (a). For starters, corporate entities are controlling persons in light
85

See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.

86 Plaintiffs have attempted to advance the argument that any company that has
control over an entity's control person is also a controlling person of that entity.
Courts have rejected this argument. See In re Jenny Craig Sec. Litig., [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,337 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that an
underwriter was not a "control person" although it had appointed one individual to
issuers' board of directors and held a minority stock position in issuer); In re Worlds
of Wonder Sec. Litig., 721 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that a venture capitalist who was a shareholder of a corporate issuer and had a representative
on the issuer's board was not a controlling person of the issuer).
87 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
88 To the extent that the individual director is liable, his firm is potentially liable
under common-law agency principles-not under sections 15 and 20(a). See Blau v.
Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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of the fact that they own their assets and are legally responsible for
them. 89 Further, they have the right or authority to control the conduct of their agents engaged in conducting their business and
90
affairs.
Persons with the authority to control the corporation's "direction
of . . . management and policies" would be controlling persons
thereof.9 ' Ordinarily, this "direction" is set within corporations by
those persons authorized to control organizational decision-making
processes. 9 2 Organizational decision-making processes have been
characterized as having four steps: initiation, ratification, implementation, and monitoring.93 Initiation involves the generation of proposals for organizational endeavors, while ratificationinvolves the process
of approving which of the initiatives are to be implemented.9 4 Implementation can be described as the execution or managementof organizational policies and decisions, while monitoringinvolves oversight of
those implementing or managing organizational policies and decisions. 95 The primary control functions in corporate organizations are
96
ratification and (especially) management and monitoring.
The decisional actors within formal organizational hierarchies
with authority to ratify, manage, and monitor are majority shareholders, boards of directors, and executive officers. Majority shareholders
of an enterprise own it indirectly through their shareholdings. 9 7 They
have authority to ratify and monitor with regard to certain organizational personnel and affairs because they have the legal right to select 98 and remove directors9 9 and to veto significant proposed
89 Korz, supra note 79, at 1-22.
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1958). The agent has a corresponding duty to obey directions of the principal with respect to matters within the agency.
Id. § 385(1).
91 See supra note 57.
92 Fama &Jensen, supra note 72, at 301-11.
93 Id. at 303.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 303-04.
97 KoTz, supra note 79, at 19-20.
98 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (1991) ("Directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares ... ."); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (1984)
("Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, directors are elected by a
plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election at a meeting at
which quorum is present.").
99 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991) ("Any director or the entire board of
directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the
shares.... ."); REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar § 8.08(a) (1984) ("The shareholders may
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corporate changes of a structural nature. 00 The board of directors
has legal authority over all the business and affairs of a corporation. 1 1
Ordinarily, the board ratifies significant initiatives of executive officers, 0 2 monitors their management performance, 0 3 considers and
reviews major transactions, 10 4 and generally monitors significant developments in the enterprise. 0 5 Executive officers have authority
over "ordinary" organizational affairs within their domain and such
other authority as is delegated to them. 10 6 Additionally, executive officers initiate major policies and practices, for directorial ratification,
and manage the implementation of organizational policies and
programs.07

This description of how organizational authority to control typically is distributed among the various corporate actors should not obscure the possible variations. For example, in many closely held
corporations, integration of organizational control roles is the ruleremove one or more directors with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide that directors may be removed only for cause ....").
100 See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.01 (a) (1984) ("One or more corporations may merge into another corporation if the board of directors of each corporation adopts and its shareholders (if required by section 11.03) approve a plan of
merger."); id. § 12.02(a) ("A corporation may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all, or substantially all, of its property (with or without the good will), otherwise than in the usual and regular course of business, on the terms and conditions
and for the consideration determined by the corporation's board of directors, if the
board of directors proposes and its shareholders approve the proposed transaction.");
id. § 14.02(a) ("A corporation's board of directors may propose dissolution for submission to the shareholders."); id. § 14.02(b) (2) ("For a proposal to dissolve to be
adopted... the shareholders entitled to vote must approve the proposal to dissolve
); see.....
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991) (requiring that a merger agreement "be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation"); id.
§ 271(a) ("Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or governing body sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets,
including its goodwill and its corporate franchises .. .when and as authorized by a
resolution adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation."); id. § 275(b) ("If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall vote for [a] proposed dissolution, a certificate of dissolution
shall be filed with the Secretary of State.").
101 See supra note 27.
102 Fama & Jensen, supra note 72, at 311.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 313.
105 SeeALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, § 3.02 (detailing the functions
and powers of the board of directors); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 483 n.1 (a) (5th ed. 1994).
106 Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standardsfor Outside Directon, 24
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5, 9-12 (1989).
107 KoTz, supra note 79, at 14-17.
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active involvement by shareholders in the managing and monitoring
of the full panoply of corporate policies and practices can be expected.10 8 On the other hand, a direct management role by shareholders would be rare in a publicly held corporation. 10 9 In some
larger enterprises, executive officers function much like the textbooks
suggest that outside directors function: largely playing a monitoring
role while limiting their direct management to significant corporate
events." 0 While there are variations among corporations with regard
to which of the persons with authority exercise organizational ratifying, managing, and monitoring functions, those exercising such authority will be the organization's decisional actors-majority
shareholders, directors, and officers.
Therefore, a person should be presumed to be a controlling person under sections 15 and 20(a) if they occupy a status or position
that ordinarily bestows authority to control the primary violator generally, or specifically with respect to the matter or affairs that produced
the Securities Acts violation. They should be presumed to be controlling persons if they are corporations, majority shareholders, directors,
or executive officers."' All such persons have authority to control organizational affairs and personnel," 2 as well as certain dejure duties
and responsibilities in that regard." 3 A section 15 or 20(a) complaint
based on authority to control, then, should not have to make specific
allegations concerning any actual exercise of control by the defendant
over the Securities Acts violator. Plaintiffs, however, should be required to identify the dejure source of authority to control-the status or position-and allege conduct that facilitated the Securities Acts
violations, or allege a failure to exercise authority to prevent the violations, or both. The presumption of controlling person status, based
on occupying a position or status that ordinarily conveys authority to
control, should be rebuttable by a showing of a lack of authority in
fact or that other persons controlled the primary violators to the exclusion of defendants." 4 If the theory of control by authority is based
108 HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 457-69.
109 Id. at 483 n.1.
110 Hamilton, supra note 106, at 10-11.
111 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
112 FILLEY, supra note 60, at 94-95.
113 HAMILTON, supra note 105, at ch. 10-11.
114 See, e.g., Herm v. Stafford, 466 F. Supp 439 (W.D. Ky. 1979), rev'd in part, afl'd in
part,663 F.2d 669 (1981) (holding that an employee who supervised stores but had
no role in policy matters, who read corporate materials stating he was Vice President
but never agreed to become an officer, and who was not in a position to participate in
securities violations was not a controlling person).
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on group control, a definitive act of disassociation from the group or
the group's role in the subject violations should allow for severance
from the defendant group by the disassociating member." 5
The presumption of controlling person status for persons with
organizational authority, suggested herein, is based in part on a recognition that a person occupying a position that ordinarily conveys the
authority to interdict Securities Acts violations has, at least in theory,
control within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). It is conceded
that status as a corporation, majority shareholder, director, or executive officer, as a practical matter, would in many cases present no
meaningful opportunity to detect and/or interdict particular violations of the Securities Acts, even with the most conscientious effort.
Nonetheless, it is appropriate that the burden of making such a showing should be placed, during the defense phase of a controlling person action, upon those persons who have voluntarily assumed a status
or position that ordinarily conveys certain authority to control. Such
persons should not be encouraged to ignore the duties and responsibilities-fiduciary and otherwise-attendant to that control. Indeed,
the initial concern that led to the enactment of section 15 focused on
the abdication of responsibility by persons clothed with authority--cor-

porate directors. 1 6 These same considerations justify presuming controlling person status for persons occupying authority to control
positions even though some such persons will, in fact, have lacked the
power to control the primary Securities Acts violators in the particular
organizational framework, because they lacked authority in fact or because other persons controlled to their exclusion.
Moreover, the presumptions suggested herein are justified because a full evaluation of control under sections 15 and 20(a) frequently will involve some difficult and subjective judgments. 11 7 In the
early stages of sections 15 and 20(a) actions, plaintiffs may be forced
to proceed primarily on the basis of public information. They, understandably, are unlikely to be knowledgeable about the intricacies of
intra- and extra-corporate patterns of control in some organizational
frameworks. Departures from the usual patterns of control are matters the presumed controlling person is in a superior position to address, relative to the position of the plaintiff. Moreover, analysis of
organizational control can be facilitated by subjecting corporate officialdom to discovery, since even if those in positions of authority in an
115 The dissociation option for directors under statute may suggest a model. See
infra note 311.
116 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
117 See generally Mason Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 275.
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organization do not in fact control it, they should be able to provide
useful information with respect to the persons that do control it.
If persons with authority are unable to overcome the presumption of control, they nonetheless will have an opportunity to avoid
liability, since the matters of knowledge and culpability will be considered during the defense to liability phase of a section 15 or 20(a) proceeding. 1 8 Therefore, there is no need to restrict unduly the sweep
of controlling person status for those with authority to control, in light
of the fact that appropriate restriction on their liability can be found
within the sections' defenses. A discerning judgment with respect to
the defenses of "lack of knowledge" (section 15)119 and "good faith"
and "non-inducement" (section 20(a)) 12 0 will allow the judicial process to weed out the genuinely blameless in controlling person
actions.
D.

ControllingPerson Status Based on Actual Control

Importantly, the reach of the controlling persons provisions extends beyond persons that are a part of formal organizational hierarchies to any other persons possessing the power to control Securities
Acts violators. 121 Thus, while corporations, majority shareholders,
boards of directors, and executive officers will be a natural focus of
attention in a search for controlling persons, in light of their presumptive authority to control, any other persons with the requisite
power within an organizational framework can be controlling persons
within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a) based on their actual
22
control.'
For those with authority, the capacity to control is the de jure
basis that allows or commands them to direct the affairs of the primary violator. 123 Capacity for control, likewise, should be the initial
significant question in a lawsuit alleging actual control-control based
on factors other than authority. 12 4 Could the person have directed
the cessation of conduct violative of the Securities Acts? Because the
existence of actual control may involve complex factual questions, it is
difficult to generalize as to when a particular person without authority
to control will, nonetheless, be found to have had the power to con118

See infra Part IV.

119

See supra note 4.

120

See supra note 5.

121
122
123
124

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

65-69, 74-75 and accompanying text.
65-69, 74-75 and accompanying text.
62-64 and accompanying text.
65-66 and accompanying text.
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trol a primary Securities Acts violator. Obviously, such a determination may require a wide-ranging inquiry into the factual setting of the
organizational framework. Relevant factors bearing on actual control
would include all facts and circumstances that indicate that a person
or group could have, if it wished, exercised dominion over the primary Securities Acts violator to end the violative activities. The capacity to "direct... the management and policies of a person" 2 5 exists
where a person or group has any readily available source or sources of
power sufficient to enforce compliance with their will.
Shareholdings may provide a source of power that enables their
holder to exercise actual control, even when such holdings are less
than the majority necessary for legal control (authority to control).126
Where there is no majority shareholder and where a shareholder (or
shareholders) has a significant quantum of shares, such a person may
have sufficient shareholdings to control the enterprise on that basis.12 7 Further, it is the dominion over common stock that is important.
Therefore, even if those controlling a corporation through shareholdings are not the beneficial owners thereof, they nonetheless may have
actual control of the corporation because they can exercise leverage
by voting shares they control or by threatening to sell them.128
The source of power that provides the basis of actual control may
be a form of economic clout. It may be reflected by an express contract such as a loan agreement with covenants restricting certain
debtor discretion. 12 9 Actual control may be based on significant non125 See supra note 57.
126 ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, § 1.10(b); HAMILTON, supra note
105, at 604-06. According to the ALI,
A person who, either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding
with one or more other persons, owns or has the power to vote more than 25
percent of the outstanding equity securities of a corporation is presumed to
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the corporation ....
Id.
127 Id.
128 KOz, supra note 79, at 19-20; United States Temporary National Economic
Committee, Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations,Monograph No. 11, 19-23
(1940), in HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 604-06.
129 Many covenants and other agreements, of course, would be upheld as binding
if challenged. Since, however, they would not be binding to the extent that they impinged significantly on corporate authority consistent with the principles of McQuade
v. Stoneham, the real power is not so much in the contract as it is in the ability of a
provider of economic lucre to withhold it. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234,
237 (N.Y. 1934) (holding that "a contract is illegal and void so far as it precludes the
board of directors ... from changing ... [significant] policies"); see also Long Park,

Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 77 N.E.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. 1948) (holding
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binding business relationships, since a threat to their continuance
may result in one of the parties being compliant with the will of the
other. For example, a creditor may have control over a debtor corporation because, though not contractually bound to, the corporation
yields the creditor a certain amount of discretion in its governance in
the belief that the control surrendered will insure a continuous supply
of funds, more favorable credit terms, or both. 130 It has been suggested that a substantial supplier or customer may be of such consequence to the prosperity of a corporation that it will have the power to
dictate certain organizational policies and practices.' 3 ' An employment relationship may provide the employer with actual control over
an employee with regard to matters outside the bounds of the employ32
ment-based agency.'
Personal relationships may be important variables in controlling
person determinations. 133 For example, a controlling person's power
may be based, in whole or in part, on the ability to wield the power of
another person, such as a spouse.13 4 On the other hand, evidence of
disharmonious relations may be cited by defendants in sections 15
and 20(a) actions to rebut assertions of group control.

35

A phenomenon that may be described as "working control" also
may provide its possessor or possessors with actual control. Working
control' 3 6 is control in fact that may or may not have a clearly identifiable primary base of power. It may have several bases of power, including some authority. It is a phenomenon that may be explicable
that a shareholder agreement that gave one shareholder, who could not be removed
by the board of directors, "full authority and power to supervise and direct the operadons of management" of the company's principle business, violated the state's General Corporation Law because it deprived the board of directors of authority over
management). Consequently, I have not herein included contract as a basis of authority to control

130 See infra Part VI.E.1.
131 Sommer, supra note 77, at 573.
132 An employer has authority to control an employee within the agency. See supra
note 90. An employer likely will have actual control of an employee with respect to
matters outside the scope of the agency because the employee, fearing severance, will
comply with his employer's wishes even as to matters "outside" the scope of
employment.
133 See In reMTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 984 (E.D. N.Y.
1995) (deeming defendant to be a controlling person, in part, because he was son
and nephew of two of the most powerful officers of the enterprise); Sommer, supra
note 77, at 580-81.
134 Sommer, supra note 77, at 580-81.
135 Id.
136 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "Control" In CorporateLaw, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 1212, 1213
(1958).
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partially as being quasi-political in nature, since it may exist as a result
of the merging of various persons, interests, and power bases into an
engine of control. Here, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating."
Working control may be possible because no other person or persons
either has comparable power or chooses to exercise it. It may be control by default. For example, where shareholding in a corporation is
so broadly distributed that no shareholder or group of shareholders
has a large enough shareholding base for control, those persons controlling the proxy machinery and solicitation process may utilize that
power source in the organization to exercise the kind of control theoretically available to majority shareholders.1 37 Those persons with
control of the proxy machinery may in turn nominate, elect, and dominate the board of directors.13 8 While persons with working control
may have some organizational authority, such as that of executive officers, their actual control may give them much greater power than
that conveyed by their positions of authority.
Relatively little difficulty may be encountered in recognizing factors that could be relevant to a determination that a person has actual
control of another. It will not always be easy, however, to determine
whether the factors are present in sufficient quantity and intensity to
justify designating a person a controlling person within the meaning
of sections 15 and 20(a). 139 Moreover, where there are multiple bases
of power, the cumulative effect of the relevant control factors must be
evaluated. An appropriate test might be stated as follows: taking into
account shareholdings, organizational positions, commercial relationships, personal relationships, and all the other potentially relevant circumstances, what person, persons, or group is likely to have had the
power to prevent or end the subject conduct found to be violative of
the Securities Acts?' 40 If a plaintiff can identify any such persons,
other than those with authority, he will have identified persons who
may be presumed to be controlling persons under sections 15 and
20 (a) on the basis of actual control. This presumption should be rebuttable if defendants convince the tribunal that they did not have the
alleged source or sources of power to control the Securities Acts viola137 Margaret Hambrecht Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from ImproperInterference with the Management of a FinanciallyTroubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343,
344-45 (1975).
138 ADOLF. A.

BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

PRI-

86-87 (1993).
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Defining Control In Secondary Distributions, 18 B.C.
& COM. L. REv. 37, 49 (1976).

VATE PROPERTY

139
INDUS.

140 Cf id. at 58-59 (examining methods for controlling person determinations);
Sommer, supra note 77, at 582 (discussing tests for control).

1997]

LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS

289

tor or that some other person controlled the violator to their
exclusion.
A complaint under section 15 or 20(a) based on actual control
should be required to: identify the alleged controlling person; identify the primary violator allegedly controlled; identify the source or
sources of power upon which the capacity for the alleged actual control isbased or evidence of the actual exercise of working control; and
contain allegations of conduct by the controlling person that facilitated the Securities Acts violation, or allegations of a failure to exercise actual control to prevent the violation, or both. If defendants fall
to rebut plaintiffs' evidence of actual control, they should be required
to meet the statutory defenses in order to escape liability for the Securities Acts violations of their controlled persons.
The relatively automatic presumption of controlling person status
for those clothed with authority to control should not-really cannot-apply to a controlling person determination based on actual
control. Authority to control can be located relatively easily, since it
will be found among the persons that occupy a status or position in
the formal organizational framework. 141 The essence of the approach
advocated herein is that in sections 15 and 20(a) actions based on
actualcontrol, plaintiffs should be required to make the initial showing
of the potential for control by identifying a power base (or bases) that
provides defendants with the capacity for control. 14 2 While identification of a controlling person based on actual control defies reduction
to a mechanical process, the focus should be on enforceable poweron the ability to make the controlled person do what they otherwise
would not have done. 43 A more encompassing norm that would allow other factors, such as mere influence, to be "controlling" would
be inappropriate, in light of the congressional concern that the Securities Acts might have unintended deleterious consequences for persons merely because they were associated with a violator of the Acts.
Too low a threshold for acceptance of sections 15 and 20(a) complaints based on actual control would be such an unintended
consequence.

IV. DrENSES TO LIAmiLTw
A.

Overview

The controlling person determination is, in a sense, a threshold
issue. Even controlling persons are not liable if they can establish the
141 Fiu.v, supra note 60, at 95.
142 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
143

Fai",supra note 60, at 92.
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statutory defenses during the liability phase of a section 15 or 20(a)
action. 144 The plaintiff should have the initial burden of showing that
a defendant is a controlling person. 145 However, those determined to
be controlling persons should have the burden of establishing the defenses of "no knowledge" and no "reasonable ground" to believe
under section 15 or "good faith" and lack of "inducement" under sec1 46
tion 20(a).
These defenses remain remarkably undefined. Can controlling
persons satisfy the statutory defenses by showing that they did not "culpably participate" in the violations or may nonfeasance be a basis for
liability?147 Is it enough for controlling persons to show that they had
no actual knowledge of Securities Acts violations for exculpation from
liability under sections 15 and 20 (a)? Can controlling persons escape
liability by showing that their failure to control their controlled persons' violations was not intentional? Are the requirements for exculpation from liability the same under both controlling persons
sections? 148 No consensus has developed with regard to the interpretation of sections 15 and 20(a) even with respect to such fundamental
questions. Courts have approached the defense to liability phase of
controlling persons actions differently and, not surprisingly, have
achieved uneven results.

144 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
145 See First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 897 (10th Cir.
1992), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, NA., 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (stating that a plaintiff establishes "a
prima facie case of controlling person liability 'when the ... defendant [is] shown to
be a controlling person"' (quoting San Francisco-Okla. Petroleum Exploration Corp.
v. Carston Oil Co., 765 F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1985)); Hollinger v. Titan Capital
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1572 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).
146 See Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 30 F.3d 907, 912 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that "the burden of proving good faith" is on the controlling
person defendant); FirstInterstate Bank of Denver N.A., 969 F.2d at 897 (same); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979) (same); see also
Arthur Children's Trust v. Keim, 994 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
controlling person "has the burden of proving his absence of scienter").
147 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
148 Many circuit courts have concluded that section 15 of the Securities Act and
section 20(a) of the Exchange Act are to be interpreted the same, even as to the
defenses thereunder. See, e.g., Farley v. Henson, 11 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 1993); First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 969 F.2d at 897; Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1578; see also
Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 6, at 1012. But see infra notes 186-88 and accompanying
text.
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B. Liability Under Section 15 of the Securities Act
1. Standard of Care
Initially, under section 15, controlling persons might have been
held strictly liable, since as originally enacted, the provision did not
expressly provide for any defenses to liability.' 4 9 In the wake of criticism that this "insurer's" liability imposed by section 15 was too harsh
a penalty for controlling persons, Congress in 1934 set about to provide a defense to liability under the section.' 5 0 There was some sentiment to confine controlling person liability to cases involving
intentional attempts to avoid liability. In this regard, an amendment
to section 15 was offered that would have added to the then existing
statutory language' 5 ' the following defense: "unless the act for which
such controlled person is alleged to be liable under section 11 or 12
was not performed at the direction of the controlling person nor to
enable such controlling person to evade liability under said sections." 52 The author of the proposed amendment, Senator Fletcher,
explained that it was intended "to restrict the scope of the section so
as more accurately to carry out its real purpose. The mere existence
of control is not made a basis for liability unless that control is effectively exercised to bring about the action upon which liability is
based."' 5 3 Senator Fletcher's proposed amendment, with emphasis
on intent, was not accepted by the conference committee.
As a result of the Congressional amendment, controlling persons
are liable under section 15 of the Securities Act when they fail to prevent a violation of section 11 or section 12 of that Act unless "the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 4 In light of this statutory language, the standard of care under section 15 should be negligence.
This is the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court. 1 55 Controlling
persons, then, should be liable under section 15 whenever they fail "to
use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use
149 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. I use "might have been" because,
apparently, there were no cases decided under the section in the period between its
adoption in 1933 and its amendment in 1934.
150 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 4.
152 78 CoNG. Rxc. 8668 (1934) (proposed amendment by Senator Fletcher).
153 Id at 8669.
154 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
155 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976).
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under similar circumstances"'1 56 to prevent a Securities Act violation 57
by their controlled person.' 5 8 The negligence standard is an objective
standard. 159 The defense of "no reasonable ground to believe" a controlled person was violating the Securities Act applies, even if the controlling person honestly believed there was no violative conduct. It
can be observed that
[iun negligence, the actor does not desire to bring about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are substantially
certain to occur, or believe that they will. There is merely a risk of
such consequences, sufficiently great to lead a reasonable person in
his position to anticipate them, and to guard against them.160
A negligence standard for section 15 is an appropriate standard,
given that the focus of the Securities Act is on the affirmative requirement that those distributing securities provide offerees all material information concerning the offering. 16 ' Such a standard serves the
objective of fostering full disclosure, since it requires that controlling
persons apply a relatively high degree of care to see that their controlled persons provide such disclosure. Further, the standard is consistent with the liability standards of sections 11 and 12.162
2.

General Defense Considerations

What should controlling person defendants in a section 15 action
have to show to avoid liability? Controlling person defendants under
section 15 must convince the court that their failure to prevent their
156 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
157 Section 15 expressly refers to and is limited in its application to violations of
sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act. Frequently herein, reference is made to
section 15's application to violations of te Securities Act without specifically referring
to the two sections.
158 A person is negligent when he fails to do that "which a reasonable
man. . . would do, or [does] something which a reasonable and prudent man would
not do." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).

159

See KEETON

ET AL.,

supra note 22, at 169.

160 Id.
161 Section 11-applicable to registration statements-and section 12(2)-applicable to offers of securities by means of a prospectus or oral communication-both
create potential liability for untrue statements of material facts and omissions of material facts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1994).
162 Under section 11, the issuer is strictly liable. Other section 11 defendants can
escape liability, generally speaking, by establishing that they engaged in "reasonable
investigation" and believed that the statements at issue were true. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Under section 12(2), defendants can avoid liability by showing that they exercised "reasonable care." See Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980).
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controlled person's violation of section 11 or 12 occurred despite
their reasonable-that is nonnegligent-conductgiven all the facts and
circumstances. The key considerations should revolve around
whether the controlling person had culpable knowledge, or failed to
perform a securities-related duty.
The section 15 defense expressly focuses on knowledge and, consequently, so should the tribunal. It seems clear that in order to avoid
liability under section 15, controlling persons should have to convince
the court 63 that they had no actualknowledge of violations of the Securities Act by their controlled person. Controlling persons unable to sustain this burden should be liable, unless they can demonstrate that
they undertook a nonnegligent effort to prevent or end the violative
conduct of their controlled person. Furthermore, section 15 literally
requires that defenses to liability, thereunder, extend beyond the
question of actual knowledge' 64 of Securities Act violations. The section requires that a controlling person defendant not only show "no
knowledge" to avoid liability, but "no reasonable ground to believe"
that the controlled person was violating section 11 or 12 as well. Perhaps a formulation of the extension, true to the express statutory language and legislative history of section 15, would have the relevant
knowledge extend to knowledge offacts or circumstancessuggestive of violations or the signiflcantpotentialfor violations of the Securities Act Without such an extension, controlling persons would be encouraged to
"bury their heads in the sand" and ignore warnings of or situations
rife for Securities Act violations so they could claim that they knew
little or nothing about such violations by their controlled persons.
Rather than promoting meaningful managing and monitoring of controlled persons, consistent with congressional intent, an actual knowledge requirement approach would have the opposite effect.
Consequently, if controlling persons do not possess actual knowledge of a Securities Act violation, additional questions should be addressed. The section 15 defense should be construed as compelling
controlling persons to convince the tribunal that they knew of no facts
or circumstancesthat were suggestive of violations or the significant potential
for violations of the Securities Act by their controlled person. In that
connection, a trier of fact should want to know whether controlling
person defendants ignored or failed to follow up on any information
or signs that there might be activities violative of the Securities Act
being carried on by persons under their control. Further, a tribunal
should want to know whether, in light of the nature of the controlling
163 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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person's association with the controlled person, the controlling person likely was apprised of a violation or potential violation of that Act.
It would be appropriate for a court to attribute culpable knowledge to
a controlling person when there is substantial evidence to support
such an inference. Controlling persons with knowledge of suspicious
facts or circumstances rife for Securities Act violations should be
viewed as having culpable knowledge within the purview of section 15.
However, in their defense, controlling persons should be allowed to
show that they acted upon any potential for violations, for example, by
probing or investigating possible violations, nonnegligently, to a reasonable (though with hindsight incorrect) conclusion of no violative
conduct. Where the facts suggest a significant potential for Securities
Act violations, the nonnegligent imposition of a mechanism reasonably designed to prevent or interdict such violations should allow for a
65
successful defense under section 15 in some contexts.'
3.

Additional Defense Considerations for Controlling Persons
with Duties Based on Their Authority to Control
or Exercise of Actual Control

If controlling persons occupy a status, position, or role that requires them to manage or monitor their controlled person for Securities Act violations, 16 6 they should be required to show that they did
perform such duties, nonnegligently, in order to successfully defend a
section 15 claim. 167 Otherwise, knowing this function had not been
performed adequately, controlling persons would have had reason to
know of the potential for their controlled person's Securities Act viola165 Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a broker-dealer can only establish good faith under a section 20(a) defense by
proving that it "maintained and enforced a reasonable and proper system of supervision and internal control"); Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210, 1215 (4th Cir. 1990) (hold-

ing that it was proper to ask the jury whether the corporation, if found to be a
controlling person of its employee, "[took] adequate precautionary measures to prevent an injury caused by an employee, supervised its employees in an adequate and
reasonable fashion, and maintained its system of control in a diligent manner").
166 These specific duties can be implied from the more general duties of persons
authorized to manage and monitor. Compliance with statutes, regulations, and rules
generally will be required of those authorized to manage or monitor a person. Governance norms for managers and monitors of enterprises encompass compliance with
regulatory frameworks like the Securities Acts.
167 See, e.g., Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 30 F.3d 907, 912
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a court should determine what the defendant controlling person could have done under the circumstances to prevent the violation, and
then ask whether the controlling person-aware that he could take such measuresdecided not to).

1997]

LIABILITY

OF CONTROLLING PERSONS

tion. Knowledge that the mechanisms and procedures designed to
insure compliance with the Securities Act have not been fully employed should satisfy the culpable knowledge requirement of section
15. Under those circumstances a controlling person could not satisfy
the requirement that he show "no reasonable ground to believe," in
order to avoid liability under section 15.
Moreover, the express statutory language of section 15 provides a
more general standard of conduct for controlling persons-negligence-which will not be met when controlling persons fail to apply
due care with regard to a duty to manage or monitor their controlled
persons for Securities Act violations. Due care should require that in
the context of significant transactions involving securities distributions, controlling persons with monitoring and managing responsibilities have a reasonable basis for believing their controlled persons are
complying with the Securities Act. Consequently, a duty analysis
should be a part of the defense to liability calculus under section 15.
Given that the identity of controlling persons and the roles played by
them may vary greatly, the required showing for a successful defense
should depend partially on their functions and duties under state law
and how well they performed them. 68 Such an approach is consistent
with the design of a Congress that pointedly underscored the idea that
"[t] he duty of care to discover varies in its demands upon participants
in security distribution with the importance of their place in the
scheme of distribution and with the degree of protection that the public has a right to expect."169 Hence, the tribunal should determine if
controlling persons have a duty to manage or monitor their controlled person, based either on their authority to control or their exercise
of actual control Regardless of the source, controlling persons should
have to show that they satisfied that duty-nonnegligently--to avoid
liability under section 15 for their controlled person's Securities Act
violation. While controlling persons may reasonably rely on others,
some control functions will be nondelegable. For example, a director
or controlling person performing a similar function should perform
certain monitoring duties in connection with significant disclosure
documents. Such is the norm against which the conduct of any director should be measured. He will be expected to read such documents
and satisfy himself that they contain all material information, correctly
168 Such an approach to the interpretation of the Securities Act has found acceptance in decisional law. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that a person's
duty to disclose material information in order to avoid liability under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act may depend in some circumstances on common-law principles. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
169 H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 9 (1933).
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set forth.' 70 This duty should be fulfilled nonnegligently if liability
under section 15 is to be avoided.
In light of the foregoing considerations, controlling persons with
substantial immersion in and responsibility for an enterprise's affairs
should have difficulty showing that they "had no knowledge
of ...

facts" about their controlled person's (i.e., the enterprise's)

Securities Act violation. On the other hand, those not authorized to
manage or monitor and not actually participating in any managing or
monitoring function should have a relatively easier time establishing
their section 15 defenses. They would not have to show they had no
reason to suspect a violation by their controlled person arising out of
their duties-in order to avoid liability-since they would have no relevant duties. Hence,just as in the case of controlling person determinations, 17 1 the defense to liability phase of a section 15 proceeding
can be approached somewhat differently depending upon whether
defendants control on the basis of authority to control or actual
control.
Persons determined to be controlling persons, based on their authority to control, should be considered to have the duties and responsibilities that inhere in their positions under generally accepted
corporate governance norms for purposes of a section 15 defense
analysis. 172 Their defenses should be evaluated in light of these duties, which may include a duty to manage and/or monitor their controlled person's transactions and affairs173 for compliance with the
Securities Act. The incorporation of a duty analysis in an assessment
of liability, of persons with authority to control, under section 15 is
consistent with congressional purposes, and is necessary if a meaningful evaluation of defendants' adherence to the applicable standard of
care is to be achieved. Congress' concerns with regard to controlling
persons and Securities Act violations initially manifested itself in a proposed dummy director provision offered in the Senate. 174 Congress
was concerned about default of responsibility by those authorized by
75
law to control Securities Act violators.'
On the other hand, persons with actual control will not have any
duty to manage or monitor their controlled persons for Securities Act
170

See Larry W. Sonsini et al., The Roles of the Parties in Preparingthe Registration

Statement, A.L.I-A.BA. Course of Study (July 27, 1995).
171 See supra Parts III.C & III.D.
172 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (discussing the relationship between insiders' fiduciary duties and the Exchange Act).
173 See Fama &Jensen, supra note 72, at 313.

174 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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violations, to avoid liability under section 15, unless they assume or
usurp such functions. Something more than mere possession of the
power to control is required before those with actual control have any
duty to manage or monitor the conduct of their controlled persons
under state law. The necessary additional ingredient is some evidence
76 It
of significantparticipation in the affairs of the controlled person.
is authority to control or significant exercise of actual control over a
person that should create obligations to manage or monitor. When
persons with actual control share or usurp the managing or monitoring functions of those with authority to control, they should be considered to have assumed the duties attendant to those functions.177 This
well-recognized approach under state law should be applied in the
context of the controlling persons provisions. The incorporation of a
duty analysis into the section 15 liability calculus for those with actual
control who assume a duty vis-a-vis their controlled person seems appropriate, since the likely effect of a significant intrusion into the control functions of those with authority will be a breakdown of the
normal protections against Securities Act violations that those with authority to control are supposed to provide. Having stepped into their
shoes, persons exercising actual control should face potential liability
under section 15 for nonfeasance in light of their assumption of the
duties of those ordinarily granted authority to control. 78
When should a person who controls on the basis of actual control
be considered to have assumed a duty to manage or monitor his controlled person for Securities Act violations? The factfinder should
find that the person's intrusion into the organization's governance
was so significant that the person shared or usurped the role of those
with authority to control it.179 Such a test is appropriate since it focuses the analysis on the degree of a defendant's potential involvement with and responsibility for the activity that is violative of the
Securities Act. As far as the legislative intent can be gleaned, Congress
sought, with section 15, to impose liability where there was or should
have been substantial involvement in the policies and management of
176 See Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1993); Harrison v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992); Merge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985).
177 SeeA. GayJensen Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981)
(holding that, under agency principles, assumption of control carries with it obligations of the controlled person).
178 Id. at 293-94.
179 In such circumstances, the elements necessary to establish a fiduciary duty
under common law will be present. SeeAustin W. Scott, The FiduciaryPriniple,37 CAL.
L. REv. 539 (1949).
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a Securities Act violator. There should be a distinction drawn between attenuated activities in or with the controlled person and significant participation in the management of that person. A finding of
the latter circumstance should be a prerequisite for a finding of liability under section 15 based on a failure to manage or monitor. An
approach that, in effect, would extend duties to manage or monitor to
persons for remote or incidental involvement with a primary Securi180
ties Act violator is without support in the legislation or its history.
In summary, in the defense phase of a Section 15 proceeding, the
court should focus on what would constitute reasonable conduct by
controlling persons given the facts and circumstances they faced during the relevant period surrounding the Securities Act violation by
their controlled person. In light of the role played by the controlling
person, the context of the violations, and any other pertinent facts
and circumstances in evidence, was the person's behavior regarding
the controlled person's Securities Act violation negligent? Were the
controlling person's actions and reactions within the range of ordinary prudence?18 1 After examining the record and drawing appropriate inferences therefrom, can it be concluded that the controlling
person failed to anticipate and guard against an unreasonable risk of a
Securities Act violation by his controlled person in a manner a reasonable person in his position would?182 If the answer to these questions
is yes, a violation of section 15 of the Securities Act may well have been
established.
C. Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
1. Standard of Care
Controlling persons will be liable for the violations of their controlled persons under section 20 (a) unless they can demonstrate that
they "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action."' 83 Congress
offered no explanation for the difference in the language used in sections 15 and 20(a) to set forth the controlling person defenses, even
though the provision for a defense to liability in section 15 was added
180 There is no indication in the legislative history that persons other than those
with a significant stake in or involvement with the controlled person should be subject
to potential liability. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 158.
182 See supra note 160.
183 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
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as an amendment to the bill that adopted the Exchange Act.' 8 4 Some
courts have held that the liability calculus should be the same under
both sections.1 85 While controlling person determination may be
identical under both provisions, 86 the same conclusion seems precluded with respect to defenses to liability. That is because, though it
is generally accepted that a controlling person can be liable under
section 15 although only negligent, 8 7 section 20(a) liability can be
premised only on "a state-of-mind condition requiring something
88
more than negligence."'
The defense under section 20(a) should, in theory, provide a
broader avenue of escape for controlling persons than the defense
under section 15, since merely negligent conduct should not be a basis for liability. Perhaps the different language employed by Congress,
and consequently the differing standards of care, may be explained by
the fact that congressional focus in enacting the Securities Act (and
hence sections 11, 12, and 15) was on distributions of securities, 8 9
whereas Congress's focus in enacting the Exchange Act (and hence
section 20(a)) was on trading in issued securities. 90 The duties and
liabilities imposed by sections 11 and 12 (and hence section 15) are
reflective of the degree of care that should be taken by a relatively
narrow class of persons' 9 ' involving a focused set of activities with respect to securities distributions or sales.' 92 The contexts in which section 20(a) may be invoked encompass a potentially wider range of
184 See Securities Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 209,.§ 15, 48 Stat. 881, 908 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994)).
185 See supra note 148.
186 See supra note 53.
187 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976).
188 Id. at 209 n.28.
189 See Basile v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 580, 582
(S.D. Ohio 1982).
190 Id. at 582-83.
191 Section 11 of the Securities Act creates potential liability for those who sign a
registration statement, directors, experts (e.g., accountants) involved in the production of a registration statement, underwriters, etc. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). Section
12 creates liability for those who offer or sell securities either without a registration
statement "in effect," or where securities are offered or sold by means of a materially
misleading prospectus or oral communication. See id. § 771. Compare Pinter v. Dahl,
486 U.S. 622, 650-54 (1988) (providing a narrow interpretation of who can be sued
under section 12) with Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)
(discussing the "broad universe of potential defendants subject to the prohibitions of
[the Exchange] Act").
192 See HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 371 (discussing disclosure requirements and
the "due diligence" investigation under the Securities Act).
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transactions and practices, including purchases of securities.' 9 3 Many
Exchange Act prohibitions do not limit liability to a relatively narrow
class of potential defendants. The universe of controlled persons
under section 15 is defined and relatively limited compared to the
universe of controlled persons under section 20(a). Further, Exchange Act prohibitions include acts that are generally manipulative
"such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices"' 9 4 -activities
that may not be material to a firm. On the other hand, transactions
that potentially implicate section 11 are almost always material to a
firm and transactions that implicate section 12 frequently are material. Moreover, given the centrality of the disclosure of accurate information in distributions to confidence in the capital markets, a
relatively high degree of care (lack of negligence) seems appropriate
and consistent with that concern. Perhaps, in light of these considerations, a higher standard of conduct for controlling persons under section 15 than under section 20(a) is sensible.
How much more than negligence must be in evidence for liability
under section 20(a)? Must there be evidence of intentional culpable
participation in the violations or conscious disregard of actual knowledge of Exchange Act violations? Congress was silent on the appropriate standard of care under section 20(a) and no consensus on the
question seems to have evolved through judicial interpretation. 195
Some courts have taken the position that culpable participation in Exchange Act violations is a prerequisite for liability under section
20(a). 196 To the extent these courts would limit liability to controlling-person defendants shown to have knowingly and actively participated in an Exchange Act violation, they are incorrect. The section
literally does not require "culpable participation." Bad faith can be
shown by omission and the induce prong includes "indirect" inducement. Further, if participation was required, a person using
strawmen, shell corporations, "dummies," and other proxies could immunize themselves from liability much the way they did prior to the
enactment of the controlling persons provisions. Such an outcome
would contravene what Congress hoped to accomplish with section
20 (a). So while section 20 (a) clearly covers "culpable participation,"
liability thereunder should not be limited to such situations. Liability
193 For example, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to employ
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" not only in the sale but also in
the purchase of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
194 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
195 See Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 30 F.3d 907, 912 (7th

Cir. 1994); see also supra note 11.
196

See supra note 11.
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under the section should be allowed for omissions to act as well as for
acts of commission.
As for a standard of care for section 20 (a), the next discrete level
"up" the culpability scale that would constitute "a state-ofmind... requiring... more than negligence" would be recklessness. If
reckless, "the actor has intentionally done an act [including omitting
to act] of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious
indifference to the consequences." 197 This is an appropriate standard
against which to measure culpability under 20 (a), given the allowed
parameters. A more exacting standard clearly seems to be precluded
by the express language of the statute and the Supreme Court's observations in Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder.198 A less exacting standard seems
not to be required by the statute and should not be adopted because
it would be inimical to achieving the purposes of the provision.
In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court precluded negligent conduct as
a basis for liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act just as it
did with regard to section 20(a). 199 Since then, the standard of care
issue has been addressed much more extensively in the context of
cases brought under section 10(b), where heretofore, the federal
courts have been virtually unanimous in holding that a showing of
recklessness is sufficient to sustain liability thereunder.2 0 0 Reckless
conduct has been defined in most of the 10(b) cases as conduct which
is "highly unreasonable... [and which represents] an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger
of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." 20 ' The

well-accepted recklessness standard under 10(b) would seem to be just
as-if not more-compelling for section 20 (a). It has been suggested
that the Supreme Court might reject recklessness and require a show197 KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 213.
198 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
199 425 U.S. 185, 193-215 (1976).
200 See; e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1572 (9th Cir. 1990);
Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985);
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1981); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190,
1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025
(6th Cir. 1979); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1978);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977).
201 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Franks v."
Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 95,786, at 90,850
(W.D. Okla. 1976)).
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ing of conscious intent to defraud as a prerequisite for liability under
section 10 (b) .202 However, application of a culpability standard under
section 20(a) should not necessarily be confined to or constrained by
considerations that might influence the interpretation of the appropriate standard for section 10(b).
The reasons for a recklessness standard in the context of section
20(a) arguably are more compelling. Section 20(a) does not contain
the limiting language found in section 10(b); terms like "deceptive"
and "manipulative" are absent from the text of section 20(a).203
While deceptive and manipulative use of controlled persons to violate
the Exchange Act certainly is proscribed by section 20(a), its reach
should be viewed as much broader, since the provision and such legislative history as exists proscribe failure to control without any other
express qualification with respect to such failure. Perhaps the fact
that private rights of action under section 10(b) are implied 20 4 might
influence the Supreme Court to reject a recklessness standard thereunder. However, it is important to focus upon the fact that by contrast, section 20(a) was specifically fashioned to provide monetary
20 5
relief to private parties.
A recklessness standard seems more appropriate for section 20 (a)
than a requirement of intentional wrongful participation or conscious
disregard of actual knowledge. As has been observed with regard to
the appropriate standard of care for section 10(b), " t] o require in all
type cases that a factfinder must find a specific intent to deceive or
defraud would for all intents and purposes disembowel the private
cause of action .... "206 This observation applies more compellingly
with regard to section 20(a). Concern about evasion of responsibility
and liability by persons with power was at the heart of congressional
efforts manifested by the controlling persons provisions. Holding
these persons responsible and liable had been difficult, if not impossible.20 7 Given their sophistication and power, few if any will ever be

held accountable under section 20(a) if evidence of conscious intent
202 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to employ "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in the purchase or sale of securities. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).

203 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
204 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see also
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("[A] private right of
action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized
for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." (citations omitted)).
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
206 Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
207 See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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to defraud is a prerequisite to their liability, in light of the subtleties
sometimes involved in control. Such a result clearly would seem to be
at odds with what Congress hoped to accomplish. A recklessness standard allows for a meaningful application of section 20 (a) more consistent with congressional purposes than would intentional wrongful
participation or conscious disregard of actual knowledge tests. Moreover, a recklessness standard is compatible with good faith-one
prong of the defense standard expressly provided for by Congress in
section 20(a) 208 Good faith has been defined as "that state of mind
denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud,
and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or
209
obligation."
Under section 20 (a) the defense provided is two-fold-good faith
and non-inducement directly or indirectly.2 10 In light of the conjunctive
structure of the statute, both elements of the defense should be established to avoid liability under section 20 (a). The reason for the addition of the inducement element to the exculpatory test is far from
clear. It might be suggested that the addition of this element to the
good faith standard was superfluous since inducing Exchange Act violations seemingly would be the kind of purposive activity that would
2
not be within the concept of good faith. "
Perhaps it is the "indirect" inducement prong of section 20(a)
that is the significant addition. This prong of the defense may reflect
congressional recognition of the fact that in the sometimes complex
web of enterprise control, employee conduct will be determined by
factors other than directives. Controlled persons operate in a framework and environment dominated by controlling persons. If their
controlling persons reward them for accomplishing their securitiesrelated missions without regard to whether they are accomplished dishonestly or ineptly, they are, in effect, issuing an indirect invitation to
violative activity. Violations of the Exchange Act may be a consequence of a controlling person's disregard for how their controlled
persons perform their securities-related tasks. It seems clear that
there is greater temptation and opportunity for Exchange Act violations where supervision is absent or slack. Therefore, failure to monitor securities matters and practices for compliance with the Exchange
Act may indirectly induce violations of the Act. The inducement
208 See supra note 5.
209 BLAc's LAW DICIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990).
210 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
211 "Induce" has been defined as "[t]o bring on or about, to affect, cause, to influence to an act or course of conduct, lead by persuasion or reasoning, incite by motives, prevail on." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 775 (6th ed. 1990).
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prong-especially the indirect element-of section 20 (a) may provide
additional support for the notion that a successful defense thereunder
should require more than a showing of lack of culpable participation
or actual knowledge. A person could induce indirectly without crossing either of these two thresholds.
2.

General Defense Considerations

What should controlling person defendants in section 20(a) actions have to show to avoid liability? They should have the burden of
showing that their failure to prevent their controlled person's Exchange Act violation was not due to their conscious intent to allow the
violation or their reckless indifference with regard to the possibility of
a violation. While mere erroneous conduct and behavior alone, as
measured against an objective standard, can subject a controlling person to liability under section 15, such conduct alone should not
render one liable under section 20(a). "'Good faith' is inherently a
subjective quality of the person acting or omitting to act rather than
an objective description of the person's act or omission." 2 12 Hence,
there can be no liability under section 20(a) unless the tribunal concludes that the defendant's "state of mind" reflected "conscious
indifference."
Section 20(a) defendants must convince the tribunal that they
were free of bad faith and "inducing" conduct with respect to their
controlled persons' Exchange Act violations. Where, contrary to their
claims, controlling persons are shown to have intentionally facilitated
a violation of the Exchange Act by their controlled persons, "bad
faith" and "inducement" will preclude a successful defense. Cases of
omission by controlling persons, generally speaking, are likely to be
more difficult to resolve under section 20 (a). In such circumstances,
overt facilitation of violations may not be so much the focus as will the
fact that defendants will not have prevented the Exchange Act violation by their controlled person. Where the issue is failure to act, controlling persons should have to show either that they had no relevant
knowledge of the violation or that they responded within the appropriate standard of care, i.e., nonrecklessly.
Just as in the case of section 15, "knowledge" of the defendant
should be a focus at the defense phase of a section 20(a) proceeding.
If the tribunal is convinced that a controlling person had knowledge
of their controlled person's violation of the Exchange Act, liability
should follow unless some effort to prevent or interdict the violation is
212

Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Director's Negligence Liability, 66
37, 53 (1990).
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shown. Consistent with the section 20(a) standard of care, such efforts must not have been reckless if liability is to be avoided. A controlling person clearly possessing actual knowledge of an Exchange
Act violation by their controlled person would be liable even under a
conscious intent standard. The more difficult challenge will be to determine when a controlling person should be liable where the evidence of actual knowledge is less than clear. Where there is evidence
to support the conclusion that a controlling person "must have
known" of facts and circumstancesstrongly suggestive of a violation of the
Exchange Act by their controlled person, liability under section
20(a)could be affixed appropriately. Consequently, controlling persons should be required to convince the tribunal that they acted
nonrecklessly in the wake of such facts and circumstances in order to
avoid liability under the section.
3.

Additional Defense Considerations for Controlling Persons
with Duties Based on Their Authority to Control or
Exercise of Actual Control

A duty analysis should be factored into cases brought under section 20(a). Since liability under the section can be premised on bad
faith and indirect inducement, courts should be required to consider
the degree of attention to duties assumed by controlling persons
before exculpating them from section 20 (a) liability. Where the facts
and circumstances in evidence strongly support a conclusion that a
violation eventuated because of a controlling person's failure to
nonrecklessly perform a duty to manage or monitor their controlled
person for Exchange Act violations, liability under section 20 (a) may
be appropriate. Under the aforementioned circumstances, a tribunal
may well draw reasonable inferences that allow it to conclude that the
controlling person's conduct reflected a reckless indifference to Exchange Act violations that established the "bad faith" required for liability under section 20(a). Where the dereliction of duty by a
controlling person is shown to have been marked, it may well have
reflected the reckless indifference that is a prerequisite to liability
under the section.
Since the provisions were enacted to address the problem of default of responsibility by persons controlling those engaged in securities transactions, 2 13 it is appropriate that the liability calculus
thereunder consider any such defaults. If in every case a person could
avoid liability under section 20(a) merely by demonstrating the ab213

See supra Part III.
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sence of culpable participation and a lack of actual knowledge of Exchange Act violations, the purposes of congressional enactment would
be frustrated. Such a least common denominator gloss would reduce
the potential potency of the controlling person provisions to the point
of wondering why Congress bothered. Moreover, such an approach
would scarcely accomplish much since any malfeasance, misfeasance,
or nonfeasance thus covered likely would be a basis for primary liability.2 1 4 If liability under section 20(a) could be premised only on culpable participation or actual knowledge, the less involved the
controlling person was in the controlled person's activities, the easier
it would be to establish a successful defense under section 20(a).
Rather than being prompted to adhere to their fiduciary duties and
provide meaningful monitoring of controlled persons to ensure compliance with the Exchange Act, controlling persons would be encouraged to be derelict with regard to their duties in order to remain
ignorant of possible Exchange Act violations by their controlled persons. Not only would such an approach be at variance with the design
of the Exchange Act, it could encourage controlling persons to violate
their fiduciary duties under state law. Such a result cannot be the
effect Congress sought with its enactment of section 20(a). Further,
the role of the controlling person is important not only for the duty
analysis. The role played can inform with respect to defendant's likely
exposure to significant facts and circumstances bearing on the controlled person's violation.
Additionally, in actions under section 20(a), consideration
should be given to whether a controlling person defendant had an
economic incentive or motive that could have influenced his failure to
restrain his controlled person. In light of the fact that "a state-of-mind
condition requiring something more than negligence" must be in evidence in a contested section 20(a) action, the possible motives of a
defendant may add significantly to the total mix of information from
which the necessary inferences will be drawn. Where the economic
incentives are considerable, the controlling person's conduct may be
explicable by or reflective of his desire for the beneficial consequences of his controlled person's violation. Contrariwise, where any
benefit would be nonexistent or de minimis, the section 20 (a) defend21 5
ant's good faith claim may be more compelling.
214

SeeAlan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud:

A CriticalExamination, 52 ALBANY L. REV. 637, 668-70 (1988) (discussing primary liability under the Exchange Act).
215 See, e.g., Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule 10b-5 Corporate
Disclosure Cases: Separatingthe Innocentfrom the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 97,
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In summary, the court will have to determine whether the section
20(a) defense will be sustained based on analyses of the facts and circumstances in evidence including an evaluation of defendant's duties
and incentives. While the test is to be a subjective one, objective
norms will serve as referents against which defendant's conduct may
be measured. The greater the deviation from the norms, the more
justifiable will be a conclusion of conscious behavior or reckless indifference. Did the controlling person unreasonably act or fail to act in
disregard of a known or obvious risk (that the controlled person
would violate the Exchange Act) so great that it was highly probable
that harm would follow? Did the controlling person's conduct indicate conscious indifference to the consequences? 2 1 6 If the answers to
these questions are yes, a violation of section 20(a) may well have
been established.
V.

CONTROLLING PERSON LABiLIT: SoME EXAMPLES

A.

ControllingPerson Liability Under Section 15

1. Example One: A Controlling Shareholder
Assume that ZZ Corporation (ZZ), an issuer, is liable under section 11 of the Securities Act because its securities were sold pursuant
to a misleading registration statement. Assume that T is sued under
section 15 on the ground that he was a controlling person of ZZ,
based on his control of a majority of the corporation's common
shares.2 1 7 Assume further that T offers no refutation of the assertion
that he controlled a majority of the shares of ZZ during the period
encompassing the section 11 violation. As a controlling person, T
must carry his section 15 defense.2 18 However, Twas neither a director, officer, nor signer of the registration statement. T testifies that he
exercised no corporate managing or monitoring role in ZZ. T testifies
further that he had no part in preparing the registration statement,
knew nothing of its contents, and in particular was ignorant of its false
and misleading statements. Assume further that plaintiffs are unable
to impeach Ts testimony because the discovery process reveals no information that is contrary to his testimony. This would be highly
likely where T has played no ratifying, managing, or monitoring role
with regard to ZZ generally or to the subject distribution. Since the
105-06 (1994) (discussing economic incentive motive as a variable in determining
defendants' scienter in cases brought under Rule lOb-5).
216 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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false statements in the misleading registration statement are the "facts
by reason of which the liability of the controlled person [ZZ] is alleged to exist,"2 1 9 and T credibly claimed ignorance of them, his defense should succeed. As a controlling person under no duty to
manage or monitor, T should not be required to show that he took
any affirmative action to assure himself that ZZ's offering complied
with the Securities Act for a successful defense under section 15.220
2.

Example Two: An Outside Director

Assume that Xis an outside director of AA Corporation (AA), and
that AA is being sued pursuant to section 12(1)221 in connection with
a securities offering that is material to the corporation. Assume further that Xis being sued as a controlling person under section 15 on
the ground that as a director of AA he was part of the controlling
group, 22 2 the board of directors. Xis unable to show that he somehow

disassociated himself from the group or that a person other than the
board of directors of AA controlled AA to the exclusion of the
board. 225 In these circumstances, X will have failed to rebut the presumption of his controlling person status. 224 To avoid liability, if AA
has violated section 12 (1), Xwould have to show that despite the exercise of ordinary care, he did not know that AA was selling its securities
through instrumentalities of interstate commerce in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act.2 25 If X is unable to show that he took

appropriate action, nonnegligently, to have his controlled person
comply with section 12(1), his defense should be unsuccessful. Because this is a transaction material to his firm, X, as a director, will
have ratified the transaction. 226 He should know that his company is
selling its securities and that sales of securities must comply with applicable securities laws. He should know as well that corporate directors
are expected to and relied upon under corporate governance norms
2 27
to monitor their corporation's compliance with the Securities Act.

Given these circumstances, an ordinarily prudent director would as219 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
220 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
221 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994) (providing for liability for persons offering or selling
securities through instrumentalities of interstate commerce in violation of section 5 of
the Securities Act (i.e., without a registration statement being "in effect")).

222 See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
223 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
224

See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.

225

See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).

226

See Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 361-62.

227 Id.
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sure himself within reason that his corporation is complying with section 5 of the Securities Act. The norm is for directors affirmatively to
believe that their corporations are complying with the Securities Act's
registration requirements in significant transactions. Knowing of the
requirements, he should have a reasonable basis for believing that it is
being complied with if he is to avoid liability under section 15 for his
negligent failure to prevent his controlled person's violation of section 12(1) of the Securities Act. Only in those circumstances can he
show "no reasonable ground to believe" a section 12(1) violation is
being committed by his controlled person.
If X has acted with ordinary care, he should be able to defend
himself successfully under section 15, notwithstanding AA's liability.
For example, he might defend his conduct on the basis of having had
a letter from reputable legal counsel opining that registration was not
required because the offering was exempt from the requirements of
registration. 228 He might assert that he justifiably relied on counsel
and that he had no reason to doubt the correctness of counsel's opinion. Under this scenario, Xmay very well have acted with the ordinary
care necessary to avoid liability under section 15.
3.

Example Three: A Creditor

Assume that Y, a bank, is the subject of an action under section
15 as a controlling person of BB Corporation (BB), a securities firm,
being sued pursuant to section 12(2)229 of the Securities Act in con-

nection with a securities offering. Assume that plaintiffs claim BB's
sales of securities were pursuant to an offering circular that contained
material misrepresentations and omissions in violation of section
12(2). Plaintiffs assert that Ywas BB's sole creditor, that its extensions
of credit provided a financial lifeline for BB,230 and that Y controlled
the affairs of BB and failed to prevent BB'sviolations of section 12(2).
Assume further that the evidence demonstrates that not only did Y
have actual control of BB,the intrusion of Y into the corporate gov228 Directors are "entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements ...prepared or presented by... legal counsel." REv. MODEL Bus. CORP.Acr
§ § 8.30(b) (1984); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991) stating:
A member of the board of directors ...shall, in the performance of his
duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon ...any other person
as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person's
professional or expert competence and who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.

Id.
229
230

15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
See infra notes 360-62 and accompanying text.
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ernance of the primary violator (BB) was so complete that Y, for all
23 1
intents and purposes, supplanted the role of the board of directors.
The evidence shows that Yratified BB's major initiatives, including securities transactions, and monitored these transactions as well as all
significant developments in BB.232 To avoid liability under section 15
in these circumstances, Y, having usurped the role of BB's board of
directors, should have to show that it took appropriate action, with
ordinary care, to insure that the circular was not false and misleading.
For example, if Y could convince the tribunal that its agents carefully
read the offering circular and reasonably believed that it contained all
material information necessary for an informed investment decision,
its defense may very well be successful. Such a showing would demonstrate to the tribunal the ordinary care required for exculpation from
liability under section 15.233 The false statements in the circular are
the "facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist," 234 and since Y had "no knowledge of or reasonable

ground[s] to believe" 235 that the statements were false, Y's defense
should be successful.
B.

ControllingPerson Liability Under Section 20(a)

1. Example Four (a): A Broker-Dealer Firm
Assume that M, an individual broker who claims to be an in-

237
dependent contractor, 23 6 has violated Exchange Act section 10(b)
23
and Rule 10b-5 8 thereunder by churning the account of 0. As it

turns out, Mis impecunious. Assume that, pursuant to section 20(a),
0 sues V, the corporate broker-dealer that M was affiliated with at the
time of the churning. 0 maintains that V controlled M by clothing
him with the imprimatur of the firm and providing him with the necessary instrumentalities that enabled him to ply his trade and that V
failed to stop the violative conduct or employ a compliance program
reasonably designed to prevent churning. 23 9 If V is unable to refute
231
232
233
234

See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
Id.

235 Id.
236 SeeHollingerv. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (discussing controlling person liability for Exchange Act violations of independent contractors).
237 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
238 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
239 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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these allegations, all the preconditions for liability will have been established. Broker-dealer firms exercise or should exercise a great deal
of control over the conditions of their operations and their individual
brokers whether employees or "independent contractors. '2 40 Further,
a failure to establish a compliance program by a broker-dealer firm
likely will fall into the category of reckless behavior.2 4 1 It will be clear
to the tribunal that controlling person brokerage firms frequently
benefit from the churning practices of their controlled persons. Such
firms should know that by lax supervision of their controlled persons
they indirectly condone and induce Exchange Act violations.2 42
These considerations should make a successful defense by V difficult
to sustain.
2.

Example Four (b): A Person Controlling a Broker-Dealer Firm

Suppose we change the previous example by assuming that Vsuccessfully refutes the claim that it controlled M by showing that E, a
forty-percent shareholder of V,chairman of its board of directors, and
its chief executive officer, in fact controlled V to the exclusion of all
other persons and exercised complete dominion over V,including its
affiliations with independent contractors. Assume that, in light of
these developments, 0 amends his complaint by dropping V and adding E as the controlling person defendant. E would have the same
burden for exculpation that Vhad in Four (a) to show that his failure
to interdict the Exchange Act violation by M was not due to recklessness. In this context, given E's knowledge base and duties, his failure
to have Vemploy a compliance program reasonably designed to interdict churning likely will be judged reckless and a basis for liability
2 43
under section 20(a).

240 See Alexander C. Dill, Broker-DealerRegulation Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: The Case of Independent Contracting,1994 COLUM. Bus. L. Rav. 189.
241 Id.; Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). In Hech4 the Ninth Circuit stated:
[F]ailure of the controlling person to maintain and diligently enforce a
proper system of internal supervision and control constitutes participation
in the misconduct and the violation will be deemed to have been committed,
not only by the controlled person, but also by the controlling person who
did not perform the duty to prevent it.
Id.; see also SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that "good
faith" under section 20(a) requires affirmative acts on the part of the controlling person to prevent the misconduct of the controlled person).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 211-12.
243 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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Example Five: A Controlling Officer

Assume that G is the President of DD Corporation (DD) that is
being sued pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder in connection with a securities offering that is material to
the corporation. Plaintiffs claim that DD has sold an offering pursuant
to a circular containing material misrepresentations and omissions.
Assume further that G is being sued as a controlling person under
section 20(a). G was the chief operating officer of DD-his title was
not merely honorary24--and he is unable to refute the allegation that
he was a controlling person by, for example, showing that other persons controlled DD to his exclusion. 24 5 Though there was an independent board of directors of DD, G had all the authority to control
necessary to dominate the securities disclosure practices of DD.246 In
these circumstances, G should be unable to avoid controlling person
status. To avoid liability under section 20(a) if DD has violated 10b-5,
G should have to show that he acted nonrecklessly to insure that the
circular was not false and misleading. Under the circumstances, given
his knowledge base, proximity to relevant events, and duties, he might
well have a difficult time demonstrating that his effort or lack thereof
to insure that DD's circular fully disclosed all material information was
2 47
not reckless.
4.

Example Six: An Outside Director

Assume that FF Corporation (FF), a publicly held corporation,
has violated section 14 of the Exchange Act 248 because its proxy statement contained false and misleading statements of a material nature.
Assume that J is sued pursuant to section 20(a), plaintiff having alleged thatJwas a controlling person based on his membership on the
board of directors of F. J offers no effective refutation of the assertion that he was a controlling person of FFin light of his board membership. J testifies that he voted to approve the proxy statement after
having read it carefully. Assume, however, that the evidence reveals
that had J read the proxy statement at all, the false and misleading
disclosure would have been quite evident to him in light of his knowledge of the corporation's affairs. A director's section 20(a) defense
should encompass the requirement that he show that he conscientiously reviewed significant documents generated by the company's
244 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
245 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
247 See supra Parts IV.C.2-3.
248 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994) (regulating proxy solicitation).
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executive officers, in connection with major transactions, prior to ratifying their actions.2 49 In these circumstances, the fact that J either
consciously intended to allow his controlled person's violation or was
reckless in ratifying, though not reading, the proxy statement should
preclude a successful good faith, noninducement defense byJ Such a
failure would be conduct which is "highly unreasonable . . . [and
which represents] an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor
°
must have been aware of it."25

VI.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROLLING PERSONS
PROVISIONS FOR VARIOUS PERSONS

A.
1.

Corporations

Control

Corporations are the legal owners of their assets that are
deployed in connection with various of the organization's endeavors
conducted by its agents. As a principal, a corporation can, under law,
command its agents within the agency.2 5 ' A corporation would be a

controlling person under sections 15 and 20(a) on the basis of its authority to control company personnel and employees who are the causal
25 2
agents of Securities Acts violations occurring within the agency.
However, it could avoid liability under the sections if it established the
defenses thereunder. On the other hand, at common law, an enterprise is absolutely liable for the tortious acts of its agents committed
within the agency-there is no defense to liability.253 If these common-law principles apply with respect to Securities Acts violations, sections 15 and 20(a) likely would not be relied upon by plaintiffs in
many actions under the Securities Acts, since liability under those sec2
tions is not absolute-there are defenses.

54

249 See Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 359-60.
250 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Franks v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 95,786, at 90,850
(W.D. Okla. 1976)); see supra note 201 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 62-64, 90 and accompanying text.
253 Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 6, at 1016; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 212-13 (1958).
254 At one time, the circuits were split over whether the existence of sections 15
and 20(a) forecloses principals' vicarious liability for the primary Securities Acts violations of their agents (such as employees). See Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 6, at 101522. Over time, however, a consensus built in favor of the notion that the existence of
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When a corporation's agent acts outside of the agency, controlling person status for the organization under sections 15 and 20(a),
vis-4-vis that agent, is not necessarily precluded. While a corporation
will not have authority to control an agent with regard to the Securities
Acts violations committed outside of the agency, the corporation may
nonetheless be a controlling person since it may have the power (ac255
tual control) to force the employee to cease the violative conduct.

Indeed, when a Securities Acts violation is committed by an employee
outside the agency, a controlling person action may be the only route
to holding the corporation liable. Moreover, regardless of whether
common law principal-agent liability principles apply to Securities
Acts violations, counsel can be expected, in some cases, to plead both
theories to cover the possibility that a court will determine that the
violations occurred outside of the agency.
An enterprise may control another organization and, indirectly,
that organization's agents and employees. An enterprise's section 15
or 20(a) control of another organization may arise from virtually any
source on which any other controlling person's status can be based.
For example, a corporation may be a controlling person when it owns
the majority of the shares of another corporation on the basis of its
authority to control (legal control) the subsidiary. 25 6 In this context,
it is the status as a majority shareholder that is significant for controlling person analyses. Similarly, a corporate creditor may have actual
control of another person in light of the power over the person pro257
vided by its leverage as a creditor.

the controlling persons provisions does not preclude principals' vicarious liability
under the Securities Acts. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564
(9th Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit has held that the contrary notion should prevail in
some circumstances. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 180-84 (3d Cir.
1981); Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975). However, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in CentralBank of Denver
may indicate that the Court would not accept liability under the Securities Acts on any
basis not expressly provided for by Congress, including vicarious liability. See Central
Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1460

n.12 (1994) (StevensJ, dissenting) ("[M]any courts, concluding that § 20(a)'s 'controlling person' provisions are not the exclusive source of secondary liability under
the Exchange Act, have imposed liability in § 10(b) actions based upon respondeat
superior and other common-law agency principles. These decisions . . . appear unlikely to survive the Court's decision." (citations omitted)).
255 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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Liability

Just as a corporation's controlling person status under sections 15
and 20(a) should be measured by the same criteria as any other person's, so too should its liability. For example, if a corporation is a
controlling person on the basis of being the majority shareholder of
another enterprise, its liability should be measured in the same way as
that of any other controlling shareholder. 25 8 By the same token, a
controlling person corporation, through the acts of its agents, may
intrude sufficiently in the ratification, management, and monitoring
functions of another person so as to acquire executive officer or director-type exculpation from liability burdens under sections 15 and
20(a).

3.

259

A Word About Broker-Dealer Corporations

In light of the inherent and substantial possibility that their
agents and independent contractors associated with them will violate
the Securities Acts, broker-dealer firms should be held to relatively
stringent standards and a rigorous, exacting burden vis-ii-vis the statutory defenses under sections 15 and 20(a).260 Such firms are expected
to, and thus should, exercise a substantial degree of discipline and
control over "their" brokers, whether employees or independent contractors. 2 6 ' Industry standards require the implementation of programs designed to prevent securities fraud in the brokerage business
arena. A broker-dealer firm's failure to demonstrate that it met industry standards with regard to preventive programs may make it virtually
impossible to claim, successfully, the statutory defenses under either
section 15 or section 20(a), since such a failure likely will be viewed as
262
not only negligent but reckless as well.
B
1.

Shareholders (IncludingCorporateParents)

Control

In a sense, ultimate control of corporate organizations reposes in
shareholders. Though the business and affairs of the corporation are
2 63
to be managed by or under the authority of its board of directors,
258 See supra Part V.B.2.
259 See supra Parts 1V.B.2 and IV.C.2.
260 See Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1575.
261 See Dill, supra note 240 at 222.
262 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
263 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
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those directors are elected 264 and may be removed 265 by the shareholders. Further, decisions about organizational structure ultimately
are made by shareholders who must ratify them.2 66 Given these im-

portant ratifying and monitoring functions, shareholders may be controlling persons where their joint, collective action is sufficient to
determine the outcome of directorial elections or structural changes.
When a majority of the outstanding voting shares of a corporation is
owned by a person or by an affiliated group of shareholders, a form of
legally enforceable control (authority) within the purview of sections
15 and 20(a) is present.2 67 Shareholdings also may provide a basis for
concluding that a person or group is a controlling person of a corporation, on the basis of actual control, even though the quantum controlled is less than an absolute majority of the voting stock, 268 so long
as it is sufficient virtually to insure the outcome of directorial elections
and removals.2 69 Though in theory direction over the activities of a
corporation is exercised principally by or through the board of directors, controlling shareholders have the power to select the board and

a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation."); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 8.01(b) (1984) ("All
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement
authorized under section 7.32."); ALl, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 71, § 3.02
cmt. f (stating that "ultimate responsibility for approving major corporate plans and
actions is vested in the board").
264 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (1991) ("Directors shall be elected by a plural-

ity of the votes of the shares ....

");

REV. MODEL Bus. CORP.

Act § 8.03(d) (1984)

("Directors are elected at the first annual shareholders' meeting and at each annual
meeting thereafter unless their terms are staggered under section 8.06.").
265 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991) ("Any director of the entire board of
directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the
shares .... ); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.08(a) (1984) ("The shareholders may
remove one or more directors with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide that directors may be removed only for cause.").
266 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text; ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANE,
supra note 71, § 1.10(a) (defining controlling shareholder as a person who owns or
has the power to vote fifty percent of the corporation's shares).
268 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text; ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 71, § 1.10(b) (providing for a presumption of controlling influence where
there is ownership and/or possession of the power to vote more than twenty-five percent of the corporation's shares).
269 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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they can and frequently do exert pressure on directorial decisionmak2 70
ing that may be dispositive.
Where plaintiffs seek to establish shareholder controlling person
status, they should be required to allege with sufficient particularity
that the person or group commanded control of a majority of the
shares of the enterprise or of a quantum sufficient to control the election of directors. Such an allegation should suffice to support a conclusion of controlling person status on the basis of possession of
authority to control (control of majority of shares) or actual control
(of a sufficient quantum of shares), unless evidence disproving the
claim is offered.2 7' If defendants are unable to refute plaintiffs' claim
of control based on shareholdings, the burden should shift to the controlling shareholder or shareholders to sustain their statutory
272
defenses.
However, where any shareholder is "grouped"2 73 with the controlling shareholders, a definitive act of disassociation should be allowed
as a basis for excluding such a person from the group. A written declaration to the other shareholders in the controlling person group by
such a shareholder of his belief that a particular act or course of conduct (that subsequently becomes a basis for a lawsuit) may be violative
of the Securities Acts would be such a definitive act.274 Disassociation

from the group should be negated if the shareholder subsequently
voted for or took any other action that advanced the Securities Acts
violation.
2.

Liability

Shareholders have certain matters referred to them by law for approval, such as the election of directors and fundamental changes in
corporate structure. 2 75 In addition, controlling shareholders may
confer with directors and executive officers about a range of corpo270 ALl takes the position that a person is a controlling shareholder "if the person
exercises a controlling influence over management or policies of the corporation or
the transaction or conduct in question by virtue of the person's position as a shareholder." ALl, CORPORATE GovWRNANcE, supra note 71, § 1.10 cmt.
271 ALl, COR'ORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, § 1.10 cmt. ("The presumption
[that an individual with 25 percent ownership controls the corporation] is rebuttable,
and may be rebutted by facts establishing that the 25 percent shareholder does not in
fact exercise control over the management or policies of the corporation.").
272 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
274 This course of action would be similar to that allowed directors. See infra note
311 and accompanying text.
275 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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rate matters from the selection of officers to various corporate policy
and operational matters. If, in the course of their association with
their corporation, controlling shareholders obtain knowledge of Securities Acts violations by their controlled person-the enterprisethey should be liable under sections 15 and 20(a) if they cannot satisfy
the applicable test for exculpation.2 76 Controlling shareholders
should be required to establish that no Securities Acts violations were
brought to their attention, nor did they learn of any through their
association with their corporation. 277 If compelling evidence shows
that controlling shareholders came into the possession of actual
knowledge of Securities Acts violations by their controlled persons,
they should have to show nonnegligent (section 15) or nonreckless
(section 20(a)) efforts to prevent or end such violations to avoid liabil-

ity.2 78 For example, controlling shareholders might show that they

importuned the board of directors to correct their corporation's Securities Acts violations, under the threat of removal and actual removal if necessary. Consistent with the purposes of sections 15 and
20 (a), controlling persons, even if "mere" shareholders, should not be
allowed to benefit where they have knowledge of Securities Acts violations and fail to act to interdict them.
However, other than in the aforementioned situations, controlling shareholders should not be liable under sections 15 and 20 (a) for
the Securities Acts violations of their enterprises and its personnel
solely because of their shareholdings. There should be no duty to
manage or monitor the corporation's affairs or scrutinize transactions
for Securities Acts violations for shareholders qua shareholders and
hence no liability, under sections 15 or 20(a), for failure to do so even
when they control a majority of the shares. Controlling shareholders
should be able to remain essentially passive and rely on their corporation's directors and executive officers to monitor and manage its securities-related business and affairs without being concerned with
potential liability under the controlling persons provisions. Moreover,
even when controlling shareholders choose to be active and consult
with directors and officers and monitor their performance; they
should not inherit the duties of directors and officers unless they
usurp or share the management and monitoring functions that directors and officers perform for the corporation. Controlling shareholders
should be allowed to participate in corporate affairs for their own purposes without inheriting corporate duties, as long as such participa276
277
278

See supra Parts V.B-C.
See supra Parts IV.B-C.
See supra Parts IV.B-C.
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tion is not dominating in nature27 9 and those authorized to perform
management and monitoring functions for the corporation are not
merely "dummies" doing the controlling shareholders' bidding. Such
a scenario might arise when shareholdings or groupings of shareholdings result in a controlling shareholder or shareholder group with
only actual control (i.e., control of less than the absolute majority of
shares that would give them legal control or authority to control)
under sections 15 or 20(a).
This approach to shareholder responsibility and liability under
sections 15 and 20(a) respects the separation of ownership and management as a fundamental purpose of the corporate form of organization.2 8 0 To require controlling shareholders to manage or monitor

the corporation's securities matters for compliance with the Securities
Acts, and hence to second guess directors and officers, would not be
28 1
or interests 28 2
sensible since such tasks will be beyond the capacity

279
280

See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
Separation has been declared "a major reason for the success of the modem

corporate form as a business entity."

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

188 (1985).

281 See generallyJA.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of ControllingShareholders'Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 9 (1987). But see Edward B. Rock, The
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of InstitutionalShareholderActivism, 79 GEo. LJ. 445
(1990) (arguing that as sophisticated institutional investors begin to accumulate concentrated stock holdings there is potential for more effective collective action by
stockholders).
282 Under what is commonly known as the "Wall Street Rule," shareholders dissatisfied with a company's management sell their shares rather than get involved in efforts to effect change within the organization. As Lyman Johnson writes:
[A]lthough shareholders possess suffrage under corporate statutes and may
remove derelict directors, recourse to this mechanism often proves futile because coordinating large numbers of shareholders into effective collective
action is colossally problematic and because management ordinarily dominates the proxy machinery. As a result, most disenchanted shareholders dispose of their stock on capital markets rather than pursue internal
governance remedies of doubtful efficacy.
Lyman Johnson, The DelawareJudiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate
Law, 68 TEX. L. REv. 865, 900 (1990) (footnote omitted). JA. Livingston described
this phenomenon succinctly.
This right to sell stock-to vote for or against a management in the market
place-is different from a vote at a stockholder's meeting. When a stockholder votes against a slate of directors, he is exercising his right as a stockholder, as an owner. He hopes to change the management and improve the
company. But a stockholder who sells says to hell with it. He is not going to
reform the company. He is not an owner trying to increase the value of his
property. He says, in effect, "Include me out."
JA.ALVINGSTON, THE AmERicAN STOCKHOLDER 61 (1958). This predisposition is not
believed to be as prevalent today as it was two decades ago. See Bernard S. Black,
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of many of those shareholders. Moreover, a system of broader responsibility and liability would complicate capital formation in certain contexts. 283 Those desirous of being passive investors or only minimally
involved in corporate affairs would want to avoid all potential control
situations in order to avoid acquiring the duties, responsibilities, and
liabilities of sections 15 and 20(a). Consequently, they would keep
their stake in any one corporation smaller than might otherwise be
the case.
Further, controlling shareholders, generally speaking, do not
have affirmative duties under state law to manage and monitor their
corporations as directors and officers have.28 4 There is no warrant for

believing that sections 15 and 20(a) were meant to change the fundamental relationship that allows shareholders essentially to be passive
investors without the fear of liability arising from corporate transactions and operations. In enacting the controlling persons provisions,
Congress seems to have been primarily concerned about passive officers and directors, not passive shareholders. There is no evidence or
reason to believe that Congress wished to affect the traditional right of
shareholders to remain passive in organizations that have functioning
(as opposed to "dummy") officers and directors.
However, where controlling shareholders do not confine themselves to normal incidents of ownership, their sections 15 and 20(a)
liability possibilities should increase. Controlling shareholders' active
participation in the governance of their enterprises may be so intrusive that they essentially share or usurp the management and monitoring functions that the board of directors or executive officers
ordinarily exercise. 28 5 Defendant controlling shareholders should
have to convince the tribunal that any exercise of shareholder rights
did not cross the participation threshold that would render the person a de facto director or officer. If controlling shareholders fall to
make such a showing, it is appropriate that they be held to the same
standards of conduct that apply to controlling persons who are
outside directors or executive officers and that they be required to
MICH. L. REv. 520, 572-73 (1990) (arguing that
large institutional investors are becoming reluctant to use this "exit" alternative because their portfolios are too large to be absorbed by the market).
283 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89

Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985).
284 Corporate statutes specify no managing or monitoring functions for shareholders qua shareholders. Corporate statutes prescribe such duties for officers and directors. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141-45 (1991); REv. MODEL Bus. CORP.ACT
§§ 8.01-8.63 (1984).
285 See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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mount similar defenses to exculpate themselves from liability under
sections 15 and 20(a).286 When controlling shareholders have authority to control (control of a majority of the shares), a conclusion that
they share or usurp management and monitoring functions of their
controlled person should be more difficult to avoid if there is participation in the governance of the controlled person beyond the normal
incidents of ownership, such as voting and making informational
inquiries.
3. A Word About Institutional Investors
It has been suggested that participation by institutional investors
in corporate governance can have a salutary effect by providing a
needed restraint on executive officers' predisposition to entrenchment and excessive agency costs. 28 7 It is contended, however, that this

potential likely will not be realized, in part because institutional investors are unwilling to take collective action for fear of liability under
286 See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. Where shareholders usurp directors they are exercising actual control because their shareholder qua shareholder
status would not provide authority to usurp board functions. Of course, in the closely
held corporation context, if the appropriate prerequisites were satisfied, they would
have authority. See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (1984) ("Except as provided in
section 732, each corporation must have a board of directors." (emphasis added)); id.
§ 7.32(a) (1) ("An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies
with this section is effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though
it is inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it eliminates the
board of directors .... "). When shareholders are authorized to assume directorial
powers and functions, they also assume directorial liabilities. See REv. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 7.32(e) (1984), stating that:
An agreement authorized by this section that limits the discretion or powers
of the board of directors shall relieve the directors of, and impose upon the
person or persons in whom such discretion or powers are vested, liability for
acts or omissions imposed by law on directors to the extent that the discretion or powers of the directors are limited by the agreement.
Id.
287 Black, supra note 282, at 521-24; Rock, supra note 281, at 448-49. Rock argues:
When the fifty largest institutions control a majority of the stock, it would
seem likely or inevitable that they would be able to organize themselves to
minimize agency costs, that is, the costs of the separation of ownership and
control. Now, at last, it would seem that an alternative to the independent
outside director might emerge. In contrast to the independent outside director-who ... is at best independent of both shareholders and management and often has no individual economic stake in effectively disciplining
management-the institutional investor would seem to have both the incentive and the abilities to constrain management.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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sections 15 and 20 (a).288 Advocates of a greater voice for institutional
investors have suggested that the controlling person liability rules
muffle the voices of institutional investors because of the rules' "overbreadth. '28 9 I believe that these concerns are overstated, especially if
the courts' approach to institutional investors under sections 15 and
20(a) is similar to that suggested herein.
When institutional investors act in concert as shareholders, they
indeed may be a controlling person group within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). 290 However, establishing controlling person status
for institutional investors likely will prove difficult for plaintiffs in
many instances. Plaintiffs will have the burden of showing that institutional investors had the requisite quantity of collective holdings that
enabled them to choose or remove directors and that they acted in
concert. 291 If the controlled shareholdings are less than a majority,
plaintiffs will have to establish all the preconditions necessary for determining actual control based on shareholdings. 292 Moreover, where
their combined shareholdings are less than a majority, institutional
investors well might argue against a controlling person determination
on the ground that their combined efforts resulted in the exertion of
293
mere influence, not control.
Furthermore, even if institutional investors are deemed to be
controlling persons, their liability risks should ordinarily not be substantial. If their participation in corporate affairs was limited, even if
active, they merely need to show their limited participation and lack
of any knowledge of Securities Acts violations for exculpation from
liability under sections 15 and 20(a).294 Their defense need not include evidence of managing and monitoring for Securities Acts violations unless their direct participation in the affairs of the portfolio
company was so substantial that they in effect shared or usurped the
organization's management or monitoring functions. 295
288 See Black, supra note 282, at 548.
289 Id. at 548-49.
290 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text; ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supranote 71, § 1.09 (defining controlling group as any group that "act[s] in concert
to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the business
organization"). The Al employs "controlling influence" in its Principles of Corporate
Governance much the way "control" is employed herein. It is clearly distinct from
.mere" influence because it is backed by some form of power.
291 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
294 See supra Parts IV.B & C.
295 See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
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Outside Directors and PersonsPerforming SimilarFunctions

1. Control
In light of their broad grant of authority, directors are controlling
persons of their organizations, since they have some responsibility for
all that the corporation and its agents do.296 Hence, no matter how
remote the violation, directors should be presumed to be controlling
persons when a Securities Acts violation has been committed by their
corporation and its agents, unless they convince the tribunal that
other persons controlled to their exclusion. 2 97 Such a conclusion is
warranted by the fact that control within the meaning of sections 15
and 20(a) does not require the direct exercise of control over the
primary defendants. Rather, all that is necessary is the power to at
least indirectly control the primary offenders. Considerations such as
practical ability to control should be addressed during the defense
phase of a section 15 or 20(a) action. 298 Of course, a directorate is a
collegial body, so that individual directors may not be able to command enterprise personnel to cease or desist from violating the Securities Acts. However, all directors can be considered to be part of a
controlling person group-the board.2 99
Some have suggested that while in theory directors control the
affairs of an enterprise, in reality they are not in a position to exert
meaningful control in many corporations3 0 0 It is contended that they
do not have the time or access to information that would enable them
to exert effective control over the management of corporate affairs.3 01
It is pointed out that directors are often bound to executive officers
296 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text; ALI, CORPORIATE GovRmNAc,
supra note 71, § 3.02 (broadly defining the responsibilities of the board of directors).
297 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
298 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
300 See ALI, COPORATE Govua-ANcE, supra note 71, § 3.02 cmt. i ("Although
board exercise of [management] power would be extremely unusual in a publicly
held corporation, it might occur .... ."); WIL~i~m L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERO,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COR'ORATIONS 288-89 (7th ed. 1995); Bayless Manning, The
BusinessJudgment Rule and the Director's Duty ofAttention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW.
1477, 1481 (1984); Cary and Eisenberg argue that
the typical board could not possibly 'manage' the business of a large, publicly held corporation in the normal sense of that term: such businesses are
far too complex to be managed by persons who put in the equivalent of five
to ten working days a year ....
In a complex organization concerned with
complex choices, policy cannot be developed on a part-time basis.
CARY & EISENBERG, supra at 290-91.
301 Manning, supra note 300, at 1481-92.
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through friendships, the "old-boy-network," and other informal
means. Further, it is maintained that there is a structural bias inherent in directorships that predisposes a softness towards executive malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance 3 0 2 Hence, it is maintained
that outside directors do little more than rubber stamp decisions of
executive officers.3 03 In sum, it is argued that outside directors realistically cannot or should not be expected to be effective monitors of
their organization's personnel and activities. Anyone accepting this
viewpoint might be predisposed to reject the idea that an outside director should be presumed to be a controlling person within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). In fact, some courts have precluded
controlling person liability on the ground that the defendant was an
30 4
"inactive" outside director.
There is no warrant for subscribing to this least common denominator view of directors. Because the law commands that the affairs of
corporations be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,30 5 it is appropriate to presume they have at least indirect control over all corporate affairs and personnel. There, however, are
realistic limitations on the capacity of directors to prevent Securities
Acts violations that legitimately may be taken into consideration in
actions against them under sections 15 and 20(a). Obviously, not all
corporate activities with possible Securities Acts ramifications will be
significant enough to command the attention of outside directors. Directors cannot review every aspect of an enterprise's operations; they
cannot be expected to consider and ratify every decision or to have
detailed knowledge about all corporate activities that implicate the Se302 See AlI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, § 1.34 cmt. b (focusing, because of the "informal" influence that executives may exert over board members, on
"relationships that may be expected to inhibit the objectivity of [board] review, not
simply on relationships with the corporation"); James D. Cox & Harry L.Munsinger,
Bias in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFoundationsand Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 85.

303 Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.Apr. 1972, at 37, 39; Alan R. Parmiter, Reshaping the CorporateFiduciary Model: A Director'sDuty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1351, 1357-58 (1989) ("Studies of the actual
dynamics of modem corporate governance indicate that management-the corporation's senior executive officers-actually operates the business and generally controls
the information, advice, and alternatives available to the board. The public corporation's board serves largely as a 'rubber stamp' for management initiatives ....
" (footnotes omitted)).
304 See, e.g., Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981) ("There must be
some showing of actual participation in the corporation's operation or some influence before the consequences of control may be imposed.").
305

See supra note 27.
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curities Acts. The greater the size and scope of an enterprise's operations, the more this is true.3 0 6

Nonetheless, there is reason for presuming all directors to be
controlling persons under sections 15 and 20(a). The fact that directors are concerned with ratifying major initiatives and monitoring
management performance is beside the point. A decision by the
board of directors ordering the corporation's legal counsel to design
and implement a systematic legal compliance or audit program to
deal with operational-level securities concerns would be a broad policy
initiative with a significant monitoring component as well. Such a
course of action may in fact be indicated where there is a pattern of
Securities Acts violations in these operational-level matters. In such a
situation, it might be appropriate to hold directors accountable,
under section 15 or 20(a), for their derogation of duty in failing to
adopt a plan or course of action designed to end the Securities Acts
violations by their controlled persons.
A justifiable lack of knowledge of Securities Acts violations by directors should allow for a successful defense to any liability under sections 15307 and 20(a). 30 8 However, a lack of knowledge, no matter
how justifiable, should not negate controlling person status; the
knowledge question should be addressed in the liability phase. 30 9 It is
at that phase in a controlling person action that the myriad of possible
justifications for failure to prevent Securities Acts violations should be
considered. As previously discussed, all directors as a board comprise
a controlling group. 310 However, individual board members should
be able to separate themselves from that group with respect to a particular matter by appropriate objection. A recorded objection by any
director to the course of conduct violative of the Securities Acts
should be allowed to rebut a presumption of controlling person status; such an objection should serve to separate the director from the
31
controlling group. '
306

ROBERT CHARLES CLARx,

CORPORATE LAW 108-09 (1986).

Professor Clark

points out that the Model Business Corporation Act was amended in 1974. Whereas
the Act had provided that "the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
by a board of directors," it was changed to read "managed under the direction of a board
of directors." Id. at 108 (emphases added). According to Professor Clark, "[t]he idea

was to preclude any possibility-no realistic possibility existed-that the section might
be interpreted to require active involvement by boards in day-to-day affairs of corporations." Id.

307
308
309
310
311

See supra Part W.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.24(d) (1984):
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Liability
a.

Significant Transactions

Generally speaking, outside directors are entitled to rely heavily
on the corporation's executive officers with respect to the management of ordinary operations of the business.3 12 More direct attention
and involvement, however, is expected of outside directors with respect to substantial corporate transactions such as public offerings, acquisitions, mergers, and consolidations. 31 3 Issuances of stock in the
aforementioned types of transactions will require disclosure of full
and accurate information in accordance with the requirements of the
Securities Acts. 3 14 Voting on such major transactions or related recommendations 3 15 and monitoring for full disclosure 31 6 in connection
A director who is present at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee of the board of directors when corporate action is taken is deemed to
have assented to the action taken unless: (1) he objects at the beginning of
the meeting (or promptly upon his arrival) to holding it or transacting business at the meeting; (2) his dissent or abstention from the action taken is
entered in the minutes of the meeting; or (3) he delivers written notice of
his dissent or abstention to the presiding officer of the meeting before its
adjournment or to the corporation immediately after adjournment of the
meeting. The right of dissent or abstention is not available to a director who
votes in favor of the action taken.
Id.
312
313
314

See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 9-12.
See Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 359-61.
CLARK, supra note 306, at 105-06.

315 See

LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLIGY- MATERIALS AND

PROBLEMS 673-74 (3d ed. 1994) observing:
[D]irector's conduct may be viewed along a continuum. At one end, directors perform their monitoring function ....
When monitoring, directors
may or may not be making discrete decisions .... At the other end of the
spectrum, directors clearly engage in specific decision-making: to build a
new plant, raise capital for a new project, acquire another corporation.

Id. See also REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 11.03(a) (1984) ("After adopting a plan of
merger or share exchange, the board of directors of each corporation party to the
merger, and the board of directors of the corporation whose shares will be acquired
in the share exchange, shall submit the plan of merger or share exchange for approval of shareholders."); supra note 100.
316 Section l's so-called due diligence defense may require directors to make reasonable inquiries with respect to the accuracy of the registration statements. See, e.g.,
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

Section 12 imposes a duty of reasonablecare on sellers and offerors of securities to
ascertain the accuracy of prospectuses. Directors bear primary responsibility for fulfilling this duty on behalf of their corporations. The reasonable care standard may
require reasonable inquiries depending on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g.,
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therewith are not duties that are wholly delegable by directors.3 1 7 Because they must ratify such transactions,3 18 outside directors will be on
notice that the corporation is undertaking important endeavors with
significant Securities Acts implications. They are, or should be, aware
that under the circumstances, they will be expected to make some effort to monitor such transactions for compliance with the Securities
Acts.3 1 9 Thus, while broad delegations of authority are the order of
the day in corporate organizations,3 20 some participation in the disclosure process in major transactions should be considered to be part of
the duties of outside directors.3 2' Unlike the shareholder qua shareholder, outside directors cannot divorce themselves from any role in
major transactions and assume that there will be full compliance with
the Securities Acts.
Any evaluation of an outside director's section 15 or section 20(a)
liability should consider whether, in connection with significant transactions, he ratified and monitored the disclosure process to assure
himself that all material information was being given to potential purchasers of the firm's securities.3 22 Ignorance of the fact that purchasers actually were being misled should not suffice as a defense to
liability under sections 15 and 20(a) for an outside director.3 23 He
Sanders v.John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980). See also SOLOMON, supra
note 315, at 673.
317 ALI, CORPORATE GovRNANCE, supra note 71, § 3.02 cmt. j ("Although the
board can (and normally will) delegate to committees the performance of parts of the
oversight function... the board must maintain a continuing presence in and ultimate
responsibility for the overall performance of that function.").
318 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
319 Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 361-62.
320 As Robert Hamilton explains,
[sleveral largely independent internal hierarchical structures may exist
within the lower levels of the corporate bureaucracy, each culminating in a
single person or, in rare instances, a small committee that has responsibility
for one or more areas or operations. A person may be 'President of the
Plastics Division' or 'Head of the Chemicals Sector' of a large corporation
with responsibility for the profitability of a multi-plant business with sales of
billions of dollars per year and yet be several hierarchical levels below the
highest management level within the corporation itself.
Hamilton, supra note 106, at 9 (footnote omitted).
321 JAMES HAMILTON, ET AL., RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS UNDER FEDERAL SEcuRrriES LAws 17 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the ShutEyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical Veww of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1183-90 (1977).
322 HAMILTON, supra note 321, at 17.
323 See, e.g., supra notes 249-50. Essentially, the analysis and evaluation should be
applied in the context of other significant transactions requiring disclosure such as
those within the Exchange Act's proxy rules.

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL-

72:2

should be required to convince the tribunal that having monitored
the disclosure process and the company's agents directly managing it,
he affirmatively believed that his company's securities were being sold
on the basis of full disclosure of all material information. 32 4 Only in
that case could he conclude that his duties were being discharged
properly. Even then, the controlling persons provisions should be
construed as requiring that where such belief turns out to have been
mistaken; such a mistake must not have been the product of negligence (section 15)325 or recklessness (section 20 (a)), 3 26 if the outside
director is to escape liability.
With respect to particular significant corporate transactions that
implicate the Securities Acts, outside directors could show that they
have not been negligent or reckless by showing that they attended the
relevant meetings, scrutinized the relevant documents, and thoroughly satisfied themselves that all relevant material information was
accurately and fully disclosed to the transacting parties, shareholders,
and the public. 3 2 7 Of course, where there is a troublesome situation
or the revelation of disturbing facts, outside directors should follow
up to a conclusion that no Securities Acts violations are present before
328
permitting the transaction to proceed.
Important factors bearing upon an outside director's culpability
and liability under sections 15 and 20(a) should include his involvement in the preparation of any documents, his sophistication, expertise, and access to information, his involvement with the controlled
person (in addition to the directorship),329 any procedures adopted
to prevent deficiencies,3 30 and the reasonableness of his reliance upon
management and its advisers in preparing relevant disclosure documents.3 3 1 An individual outside director should obtain exculpation
from liability if he clearly expresses his objections to the subject trans324

See, e.g., supra notes 249-50.

325

See supra Part IV.B.1.

326 See supraPart IV.C.l. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act requires a
director to discharge his duties "with the care ... an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances." REV. MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT § 8.30(a) (2) (1984).
327 See ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, § 4.02 cmt. c (relating that, in
general, a director or officer must read or otherwise become familiar with information, an opinion, a report, a statement, a decision, or ajudgment to be entitled to rely
on it); Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 361-62.
328 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
329 HAMILTON, supra note 321, at 30.
330 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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action on the grounds of potential Securities Acts violations and votes
against the transaction and otherwise does nothing to advance it.332
b.

Ordinary Operations

Outside directors, generally speaking, cannot be expected to do
the kind of ratifying and monitoring of general corporate affairs that
they should exercise with respect to significant transactions. Consequently, the requirements for exculpation from liability, under sections 15 and 20(a), that should be imposed upon the outside director
in the context of significant securities transactions should not necessarily be extended to ordinary corporate affairs with a securities
nexus. Securities Acts violations may occur in a context not directly
related to any specific transaction that is material to the firm. Other
than in the context of extraordinary matters like material transactions, outside directors should be able to assume that the executive
officers are managing the corporation's affairs in compliance with the
mandates of law, including the Securities Acts, unless there is reason
to suspect otherwise.3 33 Without the focus of mandated disclosure in
the context of significant transactions, there is, generally speaking, no
automatic course of conduct which should be required of outside directors as a prerequisite for exculpation from sections 15 and 20(a)
liability. Of course, if outside directors become apprised of Securities
Acts violations uncorrected by executive officers, they should take appropriate action. Outside directors should be expected to act reason33 4
ably in light of the circumstances.
D. Executive Officers, Managers,
and Persons PerformingSimilar Functions
1.

Control

Under general corporate governance norms, management-the
implementation of the corporate policies ratified by the directors-is
332 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
333 See, e.g., Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 ("[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then liability of
directors might well follow, but absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.").
334 See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP.ACr § 8.30(a) (2) (1984). See also Soderquist, supra
note 212, at 52 (arguing that the liability of directors should be determined through a
"good faith standard... that relates to the conduct itself rather than to the results of
the conduct").
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primarily the responsibility of executive officers. 335 Their authority is
set by statute, bylaws, and resolutions as well as custom and practice.33 6 A corporation's chief executive officer ordinarily has managerial responsibility and authority over enterprise practices, personnel,
and policy implementation. 33 7 However, all executive officers with
firm-wide authority should be presumed to be controlling persons of
338
all the organization's affairs and personnel under their domain.
For example, an enterprise's chief executive for corporate finance ordinarily is authorized to oversee the drafting of a registration statement and normally would be responsible for its contents.3 3 9 He could
overrule the work-product contributions of those making inputs, order that certain techniques be employed, and order the changing of
specific information offered. In light of his authority over the registration statement preparation activities, he would be a controlling person within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). 3 40 Of course, a single
management position alone may not create sufficient authority to prevent or end a Securities Acts violation. In many companies, a number
of officers and managers may be grouped as controlling persons, since
they function together in the implementation of key decisions.34 1 In
larger corporations, group action may in fact be the dominant way by
which executive management functions in many organizational
342
contexts.
In larger enterprises, with respect to important functions not centralized on a firm-wide basis, there will still be reviewing and deciding
335

ALI, CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE,

supra note 71, § 3.01 (charging corporate of-

ficers with the responsibility of the corporation's management); CARY & EISENBERO,
supra note 300, at 287 ("In recent times, it has become obvious that the traditional
legal model is inadequate. Under that model, the board of directors manages the
corporation's business and sets business policy.... All serious students of corporate
affairs ... now recognize that in the typical large publicly held corporation the management function is vested not in the board but in the executives.").
336 CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 300, at 299-302.
337 SOLOMON, supranote 315, at 379 ("The officer with the greatest authority-the
senior officer in any given corporation-generally is designated the chief executive
officer or CEO."); id. at 380-81 ("Since some corporeal person must carry on the
corporation's business, courts assume that the CEO, whether known as the president
or by some other title, has authority to bind the corporation in transactions entered
into in the ordinary course of business.").
338 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
339 Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 359-60.
340 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
341

See supra note 79 and accompanying text; ALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra

note 71, § 3.01 cmt. c (recognizing that the management function may be exercised
by a group of senior executives).
342

See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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functions performed by some person or group responsible for management. Divisions, headed by the equivalent of a chief executive officer, frequently possess full operational authority over certain
functions. 343 The potential controlling person liability of divisional
executive level officials should not be precluded, in light of the fact
that larger corporations have allocated the burden of much of the
operational decision making away from the firm-wide executive management cadre by decentralization. 344 Any such preclusion might insulate those with authority to control from responsibility for Securities
Acts violations solely due to the peculiarities of organizational structure. Divisional officers with executive authority should be presumed
to have the control to prevent Securities Acts violations by those
under their authority, in the same way as corporate officers with firm3 45
wide authority.
With respect to determining whether an officer is a controlling
person within the meaning of sections 15 and 20(a), the inquiry
should focus on whether the official was authorized to perform important executive duties of such chaiacter that he likely would have been
able to prevent or direct the cessation of the subject Securities Acts
violations with a relative degree of finality. If this inquiry can be answered in the affirmative, we should presume that the subject executive officer is a controlling person.
One potential concern with presuming that officers are controlling persons arises from the fact that the duties of particular officers
may vary from enterprise to enterprise. Each corporation will have its
own system of internal organization, and not all will have the same set
of duties for each officer with a particular title. For example, in most
corporations, the president is the active managing head with wideranging authority.3 4 On the other hand, in some corporations, the
president may have limited authority. He may only preside at meetings, perform advisory roles, or conduct ceremonial duties. Notwithstanding the possible lack of commonality in the roles officers play, an
orthodox approach stressing the "typical" features in corporate orga343

See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-

TION 20-22 (1990) (discussing the organization and decisionmaking of large firms).

344 See Hamilton, supranote 106, at 9 ("Many corporations today are so large and
are involved in so many diverse lines of business that business decision-making is diversified and diffused.").

345 Id. at 11.
346 See generally CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 300, at 237 (explaining that some
cases hold that when the president of a corporation also serves as its general manager,
he has implied authority to execute any contract appropriate in the ordinary course
of business).
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nizations should be taken. The organizational structure of individual
companies should be ignored, at least initially. For example, it should
be presumed that all presidents have, by virtue of their office, the authority of a general manager for purposes of sections 15 and 20(a).
Such a presumption, however, should be rebuttable. Corporate "presidents" should have the opportunity to prove that no authority existed
for them to act as general manager.3 4 7 All titled officers should have
the burden of proving that, despite titles that ordinarily confer authority over certain Securities Acts violators, they in fact did not possess such authority.
It is important to consider that officers, in theory and frequently
in fact, serve at the will of "higher ups." Management power may be
viewed as delegated authority, since officers may be overruled by other
officers with superior authority or by the board of directors. Moreover, even if they are not overruled, it fairly well may be implied that
officers may be susceptible to and compliant with the will of higherlevel officers, the board of directors, or even shareholders. Nevertheless, an executive officer should not be allowed to avoid controlling
person status on the theory that he could or would have been overruled or that he felt organizational pressures to refrain from taking
steps to end activities violative of the Securities Acts. An officer's controlling person status should not be affected by the fact that there was
a person or group with the authority to overrule hovering in the background, unless the officer can convince the tribunal that some other
person or persons had control to the exclusion of the officer. If officers can show that in fact they were overruled, then an exercise of
such latent power in the matter at issue should take the officer off the
controlling person hook. Perhaps to take into consideration the
aforementioned pressures and other realities of organizational life, an
officer presenting evidence that he clearly presented information, in
writing, about possible Securities Acts violations to officers of superior
authority or the board of directors should be severed from sections 15
or 20(a) actions. Consistent with the approach advocated herein, the
presumption of control based on authority should in no way impede
individual officers from avoiding liability where legally sufficient de3 s
fenses are offered. 4
2.

Liability

An appropriate starting place for considering the liability of officers will be most of the considerations discussed previously in con347
348

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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nection with the liability of outside directors. 349 Ordinarily, the chief
executive officer of an enterprise should have to sustain at least as
compelling a defense as an outside director with regard to both extraordinary transactions and ordinary operations. 3 5 0 However, it is
well recognized that whatever the standard of care may be, there may
be important variables that produce different outcomes for various
enterprise personnel in judicial proceedings to determine officer or
director liability. 35 1 The greater one's involvement in the business

and operations of the corporation, the higher will be the expectations
with respect to performance.3 5 2 Unlike outside directors who, generally speaking, perform only ratification and monitoring functions 53
on a part-time basis, executive officers perform full-time active monitoring and management functions for their enterprise. 3 54 Ordinarily,
they have somewhat broader and more extensive duties than outside
directors with respect to enterprise operations and practices, including those involving securities-related matters.
These differences between functions performed and access provided may make officers liable in situations in which outside directors
would not be.3 5 5 Executive officers have continuing access to information on which to base judgments concerning securities disclosure.3 56
Their access may mean that officers in fact know or should know more
about a corporation's activities and learn more about the corporation
in the course of ordinary business activities than do outside directors.
Moreover, the abilities of other executives and personnel may be revealed to executive officers through personal observation, meetings,
and reports, thus increasing their ability to determine their competence and reliability. Under sections 15 and 20(a), officers should be
349 See supra notes 312-32 and accompanying text.
350 See supra notes 312-32 and accompanying text.
351 See generallyEscott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).

352 Id.
353 See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 7.
354 See SOLOMON, supra note 315, at 32 ("Although the corporation statute and the
bylaws impose few specific duties, the officers constitute the management of the corporation and are responsible for running its business day-to-day."); see also ALI Com'oRATE GovERNANCE, supra note 71, § 4.02 cmt. i (observing that "officers will generally
have a greater obligation than outside directors to be familiar with the affairs of a
corporation").
355 HAMILTON, supranote 321, 1 304 ("[Lliability is more apt to be imposed upon
directors who are doubling as officers or who are involved in the management of the
company's routine business. Outside directors ... may be insulated from liability,
depending on the nature of their involvement.").
356 Id.
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responsible and liable because of the knowledge that fairly may be
attributed to them in light of their organizational activities and exposure. 357 Given the nature and extent of officers' involvement with and

dominion over organizational affairs, sections 15 and 20(a) should be
interpreted as requiring a relatively compelling defense on the part of
executive officers who claim inability to prevent Securities Acts violations by their controlled persons.
Generally speaking, the determination of culpability of officers
will depend on so many variables that specific guidelines cannot hope
to do more than provide a base from which the analysis of specific
situations can be conducted. In this regard, important factors may
include his involvement in the preparation of any documents; his sophistication, expertise, and access to information; his corporate position; any procedures adopted to prevent Securities Acts violations;
and the reasonableness of his reliance upon collateral professionals
and other officers and personnel.3 58 An individual officer's defense
under sections 15 and 20 (a) should be satisfied if he clearly expresses,
to superior officers or the board of directors, his objections to a subject transaction or course of securities-related conduct on the grounds
359
of potential Securities Acts violations.
E. Creditors
1. Control
Creditors of an enterprise may be controlling persons within the
purview of sections 15 and 20(a) on the basis of their actual control of
the enterprise's business and personnel.3 6 0 Power to control may exist
by virtue of being a significant source of financing, perhaps even the
sole source. Under such circumstances, it is hard to ignore the conclusion that the creditor has considerable power over its debtor. This
357 SeeALI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 71, § 4.02 cmt. f (recognizing that
officers have special experience and technical skills upon which others might rely).
358 See generally, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).

359 These factors are essentially the same ones that should be taken into account
when assessing director liability. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
360 See In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litig., 441 F. Supp. 62, 68 (E.D. Mo.
1978) (holding that allegations that lender defendants controlled the daily affairs of
the corporation were sufficient to state a cause of action under section 20(a); the

debtor alleged that the lender required the debtor to replace acting officers and directors, revise its debt structure, implement certain policies, give additional security,
and obtain approval before acquiring or selling capital assets); David R. Cordell, Comment, Lender Liabilityfor Securities Law Violations of Its Borrowers, 38 OiLA. L. REV. 113,

118 (1985).
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power may be manifested, in part, by a formal agreement granting the
right to control specific matters or granting some more general dominion over enterprise business and affairs. For example, covenants
may provide lenders with the right to declare a default on a loan in a
variety of circumstances, such as changes in management, mergers, or
sales of substantial assets. Covenants in loan agreements restricting
such matters as future indebtedness, payment of dividends, or lines of
business are fairly common. Creditors may even dictate management
decisions concerning matters such as which creditors will be paid and
when payment will be made, whom the debtor will retain and hire,
which assets will be held and which sold, and which contracts will be
36
accepted. '
In addition to powers over a borrower's affairs expressly granted
by contract, creditors may have additional clout that is latent, but
nonetheless potentially effective as a constraint. The control wielded
may include consulting on a range of corporate practices and policies
not expressly provided for in any agreement. The mere threat of withholding credit if the advice and signals sent during such "consultations" are not adhered to may be tantamount to a form of dominion
that equals control, even if not pursuant to any express agreement. In
other words, the tacit understanding that financing will continue to
be provided so long as its source is pleased is a form of actual control
362
a financier may possess.
Having explored several facets of control in the debtor-creditor
context, what implications can we draw about when a creditor is a
controlling person within the meaning of sections 15 and 20(a)? In
order to establish controlling person status for a creditor, it should be
necessary first to show that such a creditor would have been able to
direct the management, policies, or personnel of its debtor in a way

363
likely to avoid or end the conduct violative of the Securities Acts.

Ability to control can be demonstrated by reference to powers granted
361 See generally Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 137.
362 See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 137.
363 As David Cordell observes:
Conduct actionable under the securities laws for which lending institutions
have been held liable has assumed many forms. However, restricting discussion to cases where lenders have been attacked as parties to securities violations by virtue of their lender-borrower relationships with the primary
violators, the case law is incomplete as to exactly what conduct will render a
lender responsible under the securities laws. Not surprising, the cases tend
to depend heavily upon their facts. The degree to which the lender was
involved with its borrower has been the determinative factor in the assessment of... controlling person... liability.
Cordell, supra note 360, at 127.
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by the contract or to a quite significant debtor-creditor relationship.
A plaintiff should not be required to allege that the creditor actually
exercised some control over the borrower if he makes a credible claim
that the lender possessed the power to control the debtor and the
specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation of the
Securities Acts is predicated. 36 4 However, if a creditor defendant convinces the tribunal that there was no exercise of actual control, the
presumption of control based on power will have been successfully
365
rebutted.
2.

Liability

If creditors qua creditors, deemed to be controlling persons, have
knowledge of Securities Acts violations, they should have a duty under
sections 15 and 20(a) to direct their cessation and should be liable
when they cannot show their reasonable efforts to end the violations
by their controlled person. 36 6 For example, a letter to the board expressing the creditor's concerns about possible Securities Acts violations might suffice to satisfy the creditor's obligations under sections
15 and 20(a) where the creditor makes clear that he will take the steps
necessary to end his provision of credit. Creditor controlling persons
should have no duty under sections 15 and 20(a) other than to react
to Securities Acts violations known to them, unless they have assumed
3 67
a role within the debtor that obligates them to.

If a creditor assumes such control over a debtor's business affairs
that existing centers of authority are supplanted or joined, the creditor would have become, in effect, the de facto board of directors or
chief executive officer. 368 When creditors usurp the control of those
responsible for the corporation's ratification, management, and monitoring functions (directors and officers), their liability under sections
15 and 20(a) should be measured by the same standard. 6 9 Their
usurpation will establish their capacity for controlling monitoring or
management functions, as well as their exercise of and responsibility
for such functions.
364

See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.

365 See supra text accompanying note 140-41.
366 See supra Parts IV.B-C.
367 See supra Parts IV.B-C.
368 See supra notes 176-80 & 229-35 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 176-80 & 229-35 and accompanying text. See also Joseph W.
Bartlett & Philip S. Lapatin, The Status of a Creditor as a 'ControllingPerson', 28 MERCER
L. REV. 639 (1977) (arguing that lenders may be liable as a controlling person if they
use their favorable bargaining position to take part in the profits of their debtor
rather than merely secure the repayment of an already existent debt).
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However, there are compelling reasons why creditors should be
allowed considerable leeway to work with their debtors without undue
fear of being liable as a controlling person. Involvement by a controlling person creditor in their debtor's affairs may facilitate the ability of
the debtor to generate the additional revenue necessary to satisfy the
subject debt obligation, as well as meet other important obligations.
Creditors should be encouraged to work with a debtor's business to
protect their debt rather than be discouraged from doing so because
of an overly broad interpretation of sections 15 and 20 (a) that would
have the effect of forcing creditors to seek "early" involuntary liquidation or bankruptcy. Put another way, significantly heightening creditors' responsibility and potential liability under the Securities Acts
could tend to spur foreclosures and discourage creditors from undertaking loan workouts, with resulting defaults and insolvencies that
might otherwise be avoided. Creditors should be able to provide
counseling and advice to their debtors as well as insist upon a course
of conduct by their debtor that is consistent with the debt obligation
without undue concern with sections 15 and 20(a). If that were not
the case, long recognized and well established lending practices could
result in responsibilities and liabilities under the Securities Acts. It is
unlikely that Congress intended such a result with the passage of sections 15 and 20(a). Moreover, any such effect likely would manifest
itself in lesser involvement by creditors in their debtors' affairs in order to decrease the risks of liability under the Securities Acts. 37 0 Alternatively, the price of credit would increase to compensate for the
7
increase in risk.3 1
In light of these considerations, courts should require a strong
showing that a creditor exercised such actual, participatory dominion
over the debtor that it assumed or usurped the roles ordinarily performed by directors or officers. If controlling person creditors can
convince the tribunal that they played a lesser role in their debtor's
370 See Metge v. Baehler, 577 F. Supp. 810, 818 (S.D. Iowa 1984), rev'd in part, afrd
in part, 762 F.2d 621 (1985). In Metge, the court observed:
Most commercial loan agreements also give the lender the right to exercise
certain powers over the borrower corporation in the event of default or
upon the occurrence of other specified events. If the mere possession of such
power and influence over a borrower were enough to impose on the lender
the burden of proving its own good faith and non-inducement in the event
of a securities law violation by the borrower, the heightened potential for
liability would deter lenders from making loans to corporations involved in
securities transactions.
Id.
371 See generally Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 137.
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affairs, they should be able to obtain exculpation under sections 15
and 20(a) without having to show that they monitored or managed
3 72
the debtor to prevent Securities Acts violations.
On the other hand, the threat of liability under sections 15 and
20(a) should prod creditors to take into account their control role
before deciding when and how to exercise it in the context of securities transactions. If creditors opt to exercise dominion so significant
that it usurps the organization's normal ratification, management,
and monitoring control functions, they should do so knowing that
such intrusions will obligate them to act to prevent Securities Acts violations.3 73 If that were not the case, creditors could usurp the control
of the corporation's authorized ratifiers, managers, and monitors
without assuming their duties and consequently present the very situation Congress hoped to discourage with its enactment of sections 15
and

20(a).3

74

F.

CollateralProfessionals

(Attorneys, Accountants, Investment Bankers, and Others)
1.

Control

Collateral professionals may play significant roles in the securities-related affairs of clients that violate the Securities Acts. For example, a company, its board of directors, and its executive officers will
rely heavily on the advice and services of counsel in situations involving disclosure documents to be issued for examination by prospective
investors.3 75 Moreover, such documents will bear the imprimatur of
expert counsel that will signal compliance with applicable disclosure
standards.3 7 6 This imprimatur facilitates acceptance of the offering
and may give counsel leverage to seek maximum cooperation from
management with respect to full disclosure. Generally speaking, then,
counsel can be expected to wield influence in an enterprise's securities matters.
Independent accountants are likewise in a strategic position to
influence management because without their cooperation, many securities transactions will not be feasible. Such a conclusion is justified
when one considers the requirements of the Securities Acts with regard to certification of financial statements by independent account372

See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.

373

See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.

374
375

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Sonsini et al., supra note 170, at 370-71.

376 See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
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ants. 377 Independent auditors have the responsibility for scrutinizing

financial statements for material errors or irregularities.3 78 Auditors
hold themselves out as independent professional sources of assurance
that the audited company's financial presentations are accurate and
reliable. The accountant's role, then, is so significant in the lives of
enterprises involved in securities transactions that its potentially pivotal nature is unmistakable.
Investment bankers also may play a crucial role in an enterpriseespecially a publicly held one-advising on and participating in a myriad of financial matters. For example, issuers typically rely on underwriters not only to verify issuer representations in prospectuses but
also to acquire and process all available information to determine the
price of the issue 379 Further, underwriters' due diligence is an important imprimatur that the issue meets industry quality standards.3 8 0 As
a result of their strategic position and expertise, investment bankers
generally are looked to for advice with regard not only to distributions
377 See RICHARD W. JENNINGS

ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULA-

1173-74 (7th ed. 1992) ("The registration statement must contain certified financial statements, and the auditing firm which certifies them is subject to liability as
an 'expert' with respect to those statements.").
378 See id., stating:
The standard required of the firm in that capacity is that it "had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the
time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading."
Id. at 1174.
379 In Escott v. BarChrisConstr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court
held that underwriters cannot take the statement of a company at face value. Rather,
they have a broader duty:
[T]he phrase "reasonable investigation" must be construed to require more
effort on the part of the underwriters than the mere accurate reporting in
the prospectus of "date presented" to them by the company. It should make
no difference that this data is elicited by questions addressed to the company
officers by the underwriters, or that the underwriters at the time believe that
the company's officers are truthful and reliable. In order to make the underwriters' participation in this enterprise of any value to the investors, the
underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify the data submitted to them. They may not rely solely on the company's officers or on the
company's counsel.
Id. at 697.
380 See Investment Banker Liability: A Panel Discussion, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 557, 564
(1991) (panel chaired by Arthur H. Rosenbloom) (explaining that, although not required, an investment banker's fairness opinion can help directors avoid liability).
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but to a range of other financial transactions as well.3 8 ' In light of
these considerations, it seems clear that the role of investment bankers in the affairs of many enterprises will be significant.
Though collateral professionals frequently play a large role in the
lives of their clients, they nonetheless should not fall within the ambit
of "controlling persons" solely because of their provision of professional services, even when they consequently have substantial involvement in a securities transaction. 382 Ordinarily, collateral professionals
are agents or independent contractors; persons retaining their services make the final decisions that may be implicated in Securities Acts
violations. 3 83 The impact of collateral professionals on a corporation's securities matters ordinarily will be one of influence rather than
control.3 8 4 Moreover, subjecting collateral professionals to controlbased potential liability for decisions they do not control would be
counterproductive, since they would be deterred from participating in
securities transactions or would participate only on a more costly
basis.3 85
Furthermore, such legislative history as exists indicates that sections 15 and 20(a) were meant to impact corporate governance by
subjecting those responsible for it to potential liability. They were
designed to reach persons who control based on power (including
authority), but seek to avoid the responsibility and liability for such
control. 386 Collateral professionals have not been identified as part of
the raison d'etre for the controlling person provisions. There is no
record indicating that the role of collateral professionals was even discussed in connection with the enactment of sections 15 and 20(a).
381 SeeJENNINGS, supranote 377, at 88; RobertJ. GuiffraJr., Note, Investment Bankers'FairnessOpinions in CorporateControl Transactions,96 YALE LJ. 119, 121-22 (1986)
("The heightened level of merger and acquisition activity over the past ten years has
increased the role of investment bankers in corporate decision-making. Investment
bankers identify acquisition candidates, provide tactical advice to bidder and target
firms, negotiate transactions, and prepare valuations of companies involved in transactions."). See also Robert F. Greenhill, Structuringan Offer, 32 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1305-

06 (1977).
382 Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.
1986) ("[T] heir ability to persuade and give counsel is not the same thing as 'control,'
which almost always means the practical ability to direct the actions of people who
issue or sell securities.").
383 See supra note 24.

384 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
385 Cf Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988) (observing that a low threshold for
liability under section 12(1) would implicate securities professionals such as accountants and attorneys with only remote involvement in the transaction and might overdeter their involvement in activities related to lawful securities sales).
386 See supra Part II.
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The Securities Acts did create a new regulatory framework to which
collateral professionals had to respond in connection with their provision of services. 3 87 However, the roles of collateral professionals in
connection with securities distributions after the passage of the Securities Acts were essentially the same as before; they performed the same
tasks before the passage of the Acts.3 88 Though Congress expressly
addressed some concerns about professionals in the Securities Acts,3 8 9
there is no evidence that it thought provision of these services should
render a professional a controlling person under sections 15 and
20(a).
It is true that collateral professionals may have some leverage in
the sense they can act or threaten to act and by so doing cause management to change its course of conduct vis-a-vis a securities transaction.3 9 0 They can go to the highest channels in the enterprise or
perhaps even to the SEC or the press with respect to alleged violations, and their threats to do so might prevent or end activity violative
of the Securities Acts. 39 ' Indeed, a corporation's summer intern with
a copy of a "smoking gun" document revealing securities fraud would
387 For example, section 11(4) of the Securities Act of 1933 allows for the potential liability for omissions or untrue statements of
every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have
been prepared or certified by him.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (4) (1994).
388 See Edward N. Gadsby, HistoricalDevelopment of t4 S.E.C.-The Government View,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1959) (discussing the evolution of securities regulation
and the effects of state blue sky laws).
389 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
390 See S.E.C. v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In
discussing the responsibilities of collateral professionals with regard to securities violations, Judge Parker wrote:
In view of the obvious materiality of the information, especially to attorneys learned in securities law, the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate client required them to take steps . . . to speak out at the closing
concerning the obvious materiality of the information and the concomitant
requirement that the merger not be dosed until the adjustments were disclosed and approval of the merger was again obtained from the Interstate
shareholders.
Id. at 713.
391 Cf id. It is important to note, however, that courts have been hesitant to impose a duty on attorneys to publicly disclose the Securities Acts violations of their
clients. The Seventh Circuit, in Barker v. Henderson,Franklin, Starnes & Hol 797 F.2d
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have some control of the transaction in the sense that he could upset
it by "blowing the whistle." However, he would not have control
within the purview of sections 15 and 20(a). The intern will not have
assumed or usurped an organizational governance role. There is no
warrant for believing that the controlling persons provisions were
392
meant to be gatekeeping or whistleblowing provisions.
Where collateral professionals have another role or a stake in the
enterprise, they may be deemed controlling persons on that basis. If,
for example, collateral professionals own shares and act concertedly
with other shareholders comprising a controlling block, they may be
grouped with those shareholders and thus be within the purview of
sections 15 and 20(a).393 Likewise, when collateral professionals as-

sume directorial or executive positions or functions, they may be sub-

490 (7th Cir. 1986), rejected a plaintiff's assertion that damages should be awarded
against a law firm that failed to "tattle" on its clients' securities law violations:
We express no opinion on whether the Firms did what they should,
whether there was malpractice under state law, or whether the rules of ethics
(or other fiduciary doctrines) ought to require lawyers and accountants to
blow the whistle in equivalent circumstances. We are satisfied, however, that
an award of damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail
toward improved ethical standards in the legal and accounting professions.
Liability depends on an existing duty to disclose. The securities law therefore
must lag behind changes in ethical and fiduciary standards. The plaintiffs
have not pointed to any rule imposing on either Firm a duty to blow the
whistle.
Id. at 497. For further discussions of the professional responsibility of lawyers and
their duties to clients in securities-elated maters, see Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities (Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law) & Committee
on Securities Transactions (Section of Litigation), The Evolving Problemsfor and Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Laws (Symposium), 36 Bus. LAW. 1777
(1981) (discussing whether corporations and individual employees of that corporation should have separate or common legal representation); Samuel H. Gruenbaum,
Clients' Fraudsand Their Lawyers' Obligations:A Response to ProfessorKramer, 68 GEO. L.J.
191, 192 (1979) (arguing that an attorney's duty to disclose his client's fraud should
not be solely analyzed from the perspective of professional responsibility; rather, such
a duty should also be examined in the context of the responsibility imposed by the
SEC and the attorney's potential exposure to civil or criminal liability); Michel Rosenfeld, Between Rights and Consequences: A PhilosophicalInquiry into the Foundationsof Legal
Ethics in the Changing World of Securities Regulation, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 462 (1981)
(discussing whether the ethical obligation of the securities attorney is to secure the
rights of his client or to assist in the enforcement of securities laws by divulging his
client's confidences).
392

See Kraakman, supra note 376.

393

Cf WILLIAM H. PAINTER, BusINEss PLANNING 561 (3d ed. 1994).
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ject to sections 15 and 20(a) as controlling persons, in light of their
3 94
authority to control or actual control.
2.

Liability

If collateral professionals are deemed to be controlling persons,
for reasons other than the mere provision of professional services,
they should be liable, as any other controlling person, unless they establish their statutory defenses. Hence, for example, a person serving
simultaneously as both a director of an enterprise, as well as outside
legal counsel of .the enterprise, should have his defense to liability approached as a director-the basis of his controlling person status.
Their professional status, however, should be factored into the liability
calculus of any controlling person. In connection with the analysis of
the adequacy of their defenses, the specialized knowledge and sophistication of collateral professionals should bear on their culpability and
liability, in appropriate circumstances.3 95 Moreover, controlling persons who also are collateral professionals may be exposed to information in connection with their provision of professional services, and
such exposure may make it more difficult for them to convince the
tribunal that they lacked knowledge of the Securities Acts violations of
3 96
their controlled person.
VII.

CONCLUSION

My goal has been to identify the congressional intent underlying
the controlling persons provisions and to suggest approaches to the
provisions likely to result in the imposition of liability consistent with
that intent. If "distance" from primary violators is not to provide a
394 See id.
395 See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("What constitutes 'reasonable investigation' and a 'reasonable
ground to believe' will vary with the degree of involvement of the individual, his expertise, and his access to the pertinent information and data."); Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (declaring that an executive
committee member, a lawyer, should have known that his obligations under the statute included a requirement to make a reasonable investigation of the truth of the
statements in certain portions of the registration statement he signed); Comment,
BarChris:Due Digence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1411, 1416 (1968) ("It was clear
from the outset, however, that the duty of each potentially liable group was not the
same. The House report on the bill that became the original Securities Act stated
that the duty of care to discover varied in its demands upon the participants with the
importance of their place in the scheme of distribution and the degree of protection
that the public had a right to expect from them.").
396 Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 575-76.
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rather automatically prevailing defense for controlling persons, sections 15 and 20(a) must be interpreted in a manner designed to encourage reasonable diligence on their part. Otherwise, controlling
persons need only interpose other persons between themselves and
situations rife for Securities Acts violations to avoid liability. This is
precisely the kind of situation Congress hoped to discourage when it
enacted the controlling persons provisions. There are two major
kinds of control relevant for analysis of sections 15 and 20 (a): control
by authority and actual control. Those with authority to control can
be identified more easily since the authority-generating status or position will give the occupier a prominent profile within the context of
the subject organizational framework. It is appropriate to presume
their controlling person status, since they have voluntarily accepted
positions with the potential for, and frequently the responsibility for,
control. On the other hand, plaintiffs should be required to support
a claim of actual control by making a showing of a significant base (or
bases) of power. The somewhat inclusive approach to the question of
controlling person status advocated herein is not inconsistent with the
statutory language and, importantly, serves to place at least some burden on significant actors in an organizational framework consistent
with congressional design. It is likely that for some controlling persons this burden will be modest indeed and perhaps appropriately so,
especially when there is no exercise of the actual control.
With regard to liability, the question should be approached differently depending upon whether the defendant controls on the basis
of authority or on the basis of actual control. Those with legal control
have affirmative duties that obligate them to act. Those with actual
control have no duties merely because they have power. It is only
where there is a significant exercise of their actual power that those
possessing actual control, but not authority to control, should be obligated to manage or monitor their controlled person nonnegligently
(section 15) or nonrecklessly (section 20(a)) for Securities Acts violations to avoid liability. What is needed in the context of the Securities
Acts, and what may be achieved through a proper application of sections 15 and 20(a), are meaningful standards of conduct for controlling persons-standards that approximate legitimate fiduciary ones.
This is precisely what Congress hoped to achieve with its enactment of
sections 15 and 20(a).

